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Mitch Green, (B. Phil., Oxford; Ph.D., Pittsburgh) is Cavalier's Distinguished Teaching Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Admissions. He was University Teaching Fellow for 1995-1996 and received the ACLS Burkhardt Fellowship for Recently Tenured Scholars in The Humanities and Social Sciences, for AY
2001-2002. Mitch Green specializes in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and aesthetics. He's also interested in decision theory and
the theory of action. His current research interests include the relation between semantics and pragmatics,
speech acts and their role in conversation, self-expression, self-knowledge, and attitude ascription. SELECT PUBLICATIONS: "How Do Speech Acts Express Psychological States?," forthcoming in S. L. Tsohatzidis (ed.) John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind (Cambridge) "Speech Acts," forthcoming in the Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy "The Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States," forthcoming in Mind and Language Self Expression, forthcoming with Oxford University Press editor, with John Williams, of Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person, forthcoming with Oxford University Press 'Direct Reference, Empty Names and Implicature,' forthcoming in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy 'Grice's Frown: On Meaning and Expression,' in Meggle and Plunze (eds.) Saying, Meaning and Implicating (Leipzig, 2003) "The Status of Supposition," Nous (2000) "Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content," Linguistics and Philosophy (2000) "Direct Reference and Implicature," Philosophical Studies (1998) "On the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning," Mind (1997) "Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line," (with N. Belnap) in Philosophical Perspectives (1994) [complete cv and homepage] |