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Mitch Green, (B. Phil., Oxford; Ph.D., Pittsburgh) is Cavalier's
Distinguished Teaching Associate Professor and Director of Graduate
Admissions. He was University Teaching Fellow for 1995-1996 and
received the ACLS Burkhardt Fellowship for Recently Tenured Scholars in
The Humanities and Social Sciences, for AY 2001-2002. Mitch Green
specializes in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics,
and aesthetics. He's also interested in decision theory and the theory
of action. His current research interests include the relation between
semantics and pragmatics, speech acts and their role in conversation,
self-expression, self-knowledge, and attitude ascription. SELECT PUBLICATIONS: Books: Self-Expression, Oxford University Press (U.K.), 2007. Also available on Oxford Scholarship Online. Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person, edited with John Williams. Engaging Philosophy: A Brief Introduction (2006, Hackett Publishing). Articles: "Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States," forthcoming in Mind and Language. "Empathy, Expression, and What Artworks Have to Teach," in G. Hagberg (ed.) Art and Ethical Criticism (Blackwell, 2008). “How Do Speech Acts Express Psychological States?,” in S. L. Tsohatzidis (ed.) John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind (Cambridge, 2007): 267-84. "Expression, Indication and Showing What’s Within," Philosophical Studies 137 (2007): 389-98. "Direct Reference, Empty Names, and Implicature," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2007): 419-37. “Speech Acts,” in the Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007). "Moorean Absurdity and Showing What's Within," in Moore's Paradox (2007). 'Grice's Frown: On Meaning and Expression,' in Meggle and Plunze (eds.) Saying, Meaning and Implicating (Leipzig, 2003) "The Status of Supposition," Nous (2000) "Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content," Linguistics and Philosophy (2000) "Direct Reference and Implicature," Philosophical Studies (1998) "On the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning," Mind (1997) "Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line," (with N. Belnap) in Philosophical Perspectives (1994) [complete cv and homepage] |