FACULTY | GRADUATE STUDENT
John D. Arras, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Tragic View,” in M.P. Battin, R. Rhodes, and A. Silvers, eds., Physician-Assisted Suicide: Expanding the Debate
(Routledge, 1998).
R.A. Crouch and John D. Arras, “AZT Trials and Tribulations,” Hastings Center Report 1998; 28(6): 26-34.
John D. Arras, “Freestanding Pragmatism in Law and Bioethics,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2001; 22(2): 69-85.
John D. Arras, “A Method in Search of a Purpose: The Internal Morality of Medicine,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2001; 26(6): 643-662.
B. Steinbock, John D. Arras, and A.J. London, eds., Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 6th Ed. (McGraw-Hill, 2002).
John D. Arras, “Pragmatism in Bioethics: Been There, Done That,” Social Philosophy and Policy 2002; 19(2): 29-58.
E.J. Emanuel, R.A. Crouch, John D. Arras, et al., eds., Ethical and Regulatory Aspects of Clinical Research: Readings and Commentary (Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2003).
John D. Arras, “The Owl and the Caduceus: Does Bioethics Need Philosophy?” in F.G. Miller, J.C. Fletcher, and J.M. Humber, eds., The Nature and Prospect of
Bioethics: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Humana Press, 2003).
John D. Arras, “Reproductive Technology,” in R.G. Frey and C.H. Wellman, eds., A Companion to Applied Ethics (Blackwell Publishing, 2003).
John D. Arras, “Rorty’s Pragmatism and Bioethics,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2003; 28(5–6): 597–613.
John D. Arras, “Fair Benefits in International Medical Research,” Hastings Center Report 2004; 34(3): 3.
Talbot Brewer, The Bounds of Choice: Unchosen Virtues, Unchosen Commitments (Garland Publishing, 2000).
Talbot Brewer, “Rethinking our Maxims: Perceptual Salience and Practical Judgment in Kantian Ethics,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2001; 4(3): 219-230.
Talbot Brewer, “Appraising Temptations: Towards a More Plausible Kantian Moral Psychology,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 2002; 83(2): 103-130.
Talbot Brewer, “The Real Problem with Internalism about Reasons,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2002; 32(4): 443-474.
Talbot Brewer, “Savoring Time: Desire, Pleasure and Wholehearted Activity,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2003; 6(2): 143-160.
Talbot Brewer “Two Kinds of Commitment (and Two Kinds of Social Groups),” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2003; 66(3): 554-583.
Talbot Brewer, “Maxims and Virtues,” The Philosophical Review 2003; 111(4).
James Cargile, “On an Argument against Closure,” Noûs 1999; 33(2): 239-246.
James Cargile, “Some Comments on Fatalism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 1996; 46(182): 1-11.
James Cargile, “The Problem of Induction,” Philosophy 1998; 73(284): 247-275.
James Cargile, “Propositions and Tense,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1999; 40(2): 250-257.
James Cargile, “Scepticism and Possibilities,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2000; 61(1): 157-171.
James Cargile, “On the Burden of Proof,” Philosophy 1997; 72(279): 59-83.
Cora Diamond, “Moral Differences and Distances: Some Questions,” in L. Alanen, et al., eds., Commonality and Particularity in Ethics
(St. Martin’s Press, 1997).
Cora Diamond, “What if X Isn’t the Number of Sheep? Wittgenstein and Thought-Experiments in Ethics,” Philosophical Papers 2002; 31(3): 227-250.
Cora Diamond, “How Old Are These Bones? Putnam, Wittgenstein and Verification,” Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1999; 73(1): 99-134.
Cora Diamond, “How Long Is the Standard Meter in Paris?” in T. McCarthy, S.C. Stidd, eds., Wittgenstein in America (Oxford University Press, 2001).
Cora Diamond, “On Wittgenstein III,” Philosophical Investigations 2001; 24(2): 108-115.
Cora Diamond, “Truth before Tarski: After Sluga, after Ricketts, after Geach, after Goldfarb, Hylton, Floyd, and Van Heijenoort,” in E.H. Reck, ed., From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2001).
Daniel Devereux, “Socrates’ Kantian Conception of Virtue,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 1995; 33(3): 381-408.
Daniel Devereux, Associate Editor, The Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy, (Greenwood, 1997).
Daniel Devereux, “Plato’s Metaphysics,” in C. Shields, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Ancient Philosophy (Blackwell Publishing, 2003).
Daniel Devereux, “The Relationship between Books Zeta and Eta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2003; 25: 159-211.
Peter Heath, translator and editor (with J. Schneewind) of Immanuel Kant’s Lectures on Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Brie Gertler, “A Defense of the Knowledge Argument,” Philosophical Studies 1999; 93(3): 317-336.
Brie Gertler, “Functionalism’s Methodological Predicament,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 2000; 38(1): 77-94.
Brie Gertler, “Introspecting Phenomenal States,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2001; 63(2): 305-328.
Brie Gertler, “The Explanatory Gap is Not an Illusion,” Mind 2001; 110(439): 689-694.
Brie Gertler, “Can Feminists be Cartesians?” Dialogue 2002; 41(1): 91-112.
Brie Gertler, “The Mechanics of Self-Knowledge,” Philosophical Topics 2002; 28: 125-146.
Brie Gertler, “Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments about the Mind,” Noûs 2002; 36(1): 22-49.
Brie Gertler, “Self-Knowledge,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2003 (Spring Edition), E.N. Zalta, ed.,
URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/self-knowledge/.
Brie Gertler, ed., Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge (Ashgate, 2003).
Brie Gertler, “How to Draw Ontological Conclusions from Introspective Data,” in B. Gertler, ed., Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge
(Ashgate, 2003).
Brie Gertler, “We can’t know a priori that H2O exists. But can we know that water does?” Analysis 2004; 64(281): 44-47.
Brie Gertler, “Simulation Theory on Conceptual Grounds,” Protosociology [forthcoming].
Brie Gertler, “Can Consciousness and Qualia Be Reduced?” in R. Stainton, ed., Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Blackwell Publishing, forthcoming).
Mitchell S. Green, “Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma,” (with C. Bicchieri) in G. Holmstrom-Hintikki and R. Tuomela, eds.
Contemporary Action Theory (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).
Mitchell S. Green, “Attitude Ascription’s Affinity to Measurement,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1999; 7(3): 323-348.
Mitchell S. Green, “On the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning,” Mind 1997; 106(422): 217-243.
Mitchell S. Green, “Direct Reference and Implicature,” Philosophical Studies 1998; 91(1): 61-90.
Mitchell S. Green, “Illocutions, Implicata and What a Conversation Requires,” Pragmatics and Cognition 1999; 7(1): 65-92.
Mitchell S. Green, “Moore’s Many Paradoxes,” Philosophical Papers 1999; 28(2): 97-109.
Mitchell S. Green, “The Status of Supposition,” Noûs 2000; 34(3): 376-399.
Mitchell S. Green, “Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content,” Linguistics and Philosophy 2000; 23(5): 435-473.
Mitchell S. Green, “The Inferential Significance of Frege’s Assertion Sign,” Facta Philosophica 2002; 4(2): 201-229.
Mitchell S. Green, “Grice’s Frown: On Meaning and Expression,” in G. Meggle and C. Plunze, eds., Saying, Meaning, Implicating (University
of Leipzig Press, 2003).
Mitchell S. Green, “Intention and Authenticity in Facial Expressions of Pain,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2002; 25(4): 460-1.
Mitchell S. Green and J. Williams, eds., Moore’s Paradox: Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
Paul W. Humphreys, “The Grand Leap,” (with D. Freedman) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1996; 47(1): 113-123.
Paul W. Humphreys, “Aspects of Emergence,” Philosophical Topics 1996; 24(1): 53-70.
Paul W. Humphreys, “How Properties Emerge,” Philosophy of Science 1997; 64(1): 1-17.
Paul W. Humphreys, “Emergence, Not Supervenience,” Philosophy of Science 1997; 64(4 Suppl.): S337-S345.
Paul W. Humphreys, “A Critical Appraisal of Causal Discovery Algorithms,” in V.R. McKim and S.P. Turner, eds., Causality in Crisis? (University of Notre Dame
Press, 1997).
Paul W. Humphreys, “Computational Empiricism,” in B.C. van Fraassen, ed., Topics in the Foundations of Statistics (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).
Paul W. Humphreys, “Are There Algorithms that Discover Causal Structure?” (with D. Freedman), Synthese 1999; 121(1-2): 29-54.
Paul W. Humphreys, “Analytic and Synthetic Understanding,” J.H. Fetzer, ed., Science, Explanation, and Rationality: Aspects of the Philosophy of Carl G.
Hempel (Oxford University Press, 2000).
Paul W. Humphreys, “Extending Ourselves,” in M. Carrier, G.J. Massey and L. Ruetsche, eds., Science at Century’s End: Philosophical Questions on the
Progress and Limits of Science (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000).
Paul W. Humphreys and J.H. Fetzer, eds., The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and Its Origins, (Kluwer, 1998).
Paul W. Humphreys, “Mathematical Modeling in the Social Sciences,” in P. Roth and S. Turner, eds., Guidebook to the Philosophy of Social Science
(Blackwell Publishing, 2002).
Paul W. Humphreys, “Computational Models,” Philosophy of Science 2002; 69(3 Suppl.): S1-S11.
Paul W. Humphreys, “Scientific Knowledge,” in I. Niinuluoto, M. Sintonen and J. Wolenski, eds., Handbook of Epistemology (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004).
Paul W. Humphreys, Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, Empiricism, and Scientific Method (Oxford University Press, 2004).
Harold Langsam, “How to Combat Nihilism: Reflections on Nietzsche’s Critique of Morality,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 1997; 14(2): 235-253.
Harold Langsam, “Kant’s Compatibilism and His Two Conceptions of Truth,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 2000; 81(2): 164-188.
Harold Langsam, “The Theory of Appearing Defended,” Philosophical Studies 1997; 87(1): 33-59.
Harold Langsam, “Experiences, Thoughts, and Qualia,” Philosophical Studies 2000; 99(3): 269-295.
Harold Langsam, “Why Colors Do Look Like Dispositions,” The Philosophical Quarterly 2000; 50(198): 68-75.
Harold Langsam, “Pain, Personal Identity, and the Deep Further Fact,” Erkenntnis 2001; 54(2): 247-271.
Harold Langsam, “Strategy for Dualists,” Metaphilosophy 2001; 32(4): 395-418.
Harold Langsam, “Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Inner Observation,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2002; 80(1): 42-61.
Harold Langsam, “Consciousness, Experience and Justification,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2002; 32(1): 1-28.
Antonia LoLordo, “Probability and Skepticism about Reason in Hume’s Treatise,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 2000; 8(3): 419-446.
Antonia Lolordo, “‘Descartes’ One Rule of Logic’: Gassendi’s Critique of Clear and Distinct Perception,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy [forthcoming].
Antonia Lolordo, “Descartes and Malebranche on Thought, Sensation and the Nature of the Mind,” Journal of the History of Philosophy [forthcoming].
Antonia Lolordo, “Gassendi on Human Knowledge of the Mind,” Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie [forthcoming].
Antonia Lolordo, “Empiricist Critiques of Rationalist Psychology,” in A. Nelson, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Rationalism (Blackwell Publishing, forthcoming).
Loren Lomasky, “Justice to Charity,” Social Philosophy and Policy 1995; 12(2): 32-53.
Loren Lomasky, “Libertarianism as If (the Other 99 Percent of) People Mattered,” Social Philosophy and Policy 1998; 15(2): 350-371.
Loren Lomasky, “Liberty and Welfare Goods: Reflection on Clashing Liberalisms,” Journal of Ethics 2000; 4(1-2): 99-113.
Loren Lomasky, “Aid without Egalitarianism: Assisting Indigent Defendants,” in W.C. Hefferman, ed., From Social Justice to Criminal Justice (Oxford University
Press, 2000).
Loren Lomasky, “Is There a Duty to Vote?” (with G. Brennan) Social Philosophy and Policy 2000; 17(1): 62-86.
Loren Lomasky, “When Hard Heads Collide: A Philosopher Encounters Public Choice,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 2004; 63(1): 189-205.
John Marshall, Descartes’s Moral Theory, (Cornell University Press, 1998).
Trenton Merricks, “Fission and Personal Identity over Time,” Philosophical Studies 1997; 88(2): 163-186.
Trenton Merricks, “Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience,” Mind 1998; 107(425): 59-71.
Trenton Merricks, “There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time,” Noûs 1998; 32(1): 106-124.
Trenton Merricks, “On Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic,” Mind 1998; 107(428): 845-846.
Trenton Merricks, “Composition as Identity, Mereological Essentialism, and Counterpart Theory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1999; 77(2): 192-195.
Trenton Merricks, “Persistence, Parts, and Presentism,” Noûs 1999; 33(3): 421-438.
Trenton Merricks, “Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1999; 59(4): 983-997.
Trenton Merricks, “‘No Statues’,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2000; 78(1): 47-52.
Trenton Merricks, “Perdurance and Psychological Continuity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2000; 61(1): 195-198.
Trenton Merricks, Objects and Persons (Clarendon Press, 2001).
Trenton Merricks, “Varieties of Vagueness,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2001; 62(1): 145-157.
Trenton Merricks, “How to Live Forever without Saving Your Soul: Physicalism and Immortality,” in K. Corcoran, ed., Soul, Body, and Survival
(Cornell University Press, 2001).
Trenton Merricks, “Realism about Personal Identity Over Time,” Philosophical Perspectives 2001; 15: 173-187.
Trenton Merricks, “Conditional Probability and Defeat,” in J. Beilby, ed., Naturalism Defeated? (Cornell University Press, 2002).
Trenton Merricks, “Maximality and Consciousness,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2003; 66(1): 150-158.
Trenton Merricks, “Précis of Objects and Persons” and “Replies,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2003; 67(3): 700-703 and 727-744.
Trenton Merricks, “The End of Counterpart Theory,” Journal of Philosophy 2003; 100(10): 521-549.
Trenton Merricks, “Split Brains and the Godhead,” in T. Crisp, M. Davidson, and D. Vander Laan, eds., Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of
Alvin Plantinga on His Seventieth Birthday (Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming).
Jorge Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics: The Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
Jorge Secada, “Berkeley y el idealismo,” in J. Echeverria, ed., Del Renacimiento a la Ilustracion II (Madrid, 2000).
A. John Simmons, “External Justifications and Institutional Roles,” Journal of Philosophy 1996; 93(1): 28-36.
A. John Simmons, “Associative Political Obligations,” Ethics 1996; 106(2): 247-273.
A. John Simmons, “‘Denisons’ and ‘Aliens’: Locke’s Problem of Political Consent,” Social Theory and Practice 1998; 24(2): 161-182.
A. John Simmons “Makers’ Rights,” The Journal of Ethics 1998; 2(3): 197-218.
A. John Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy,” Ethics 1999; 109(4): 739-771.
A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations, (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
A. John Simmons, “On the Territorial Rights of States,” Philosophical Issues 2001; 11(Noûs Suppl.): 300-326.
A. John Simmons, “The Conjugal and the Political in Locke,” Locke Studies 2001; 1: 173-189.
A. John Simmons, “Civil Disobedience and the Duty to Obey the Law,” in R.G. Frey and C.H. Wellman, eds., A Companion to Applied Ethics (Blackwell Publishing,
2003).
Rebecca Stangl, “Particularism and the Point of Moral Principles,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9:2 (April 2006) 201-229.
David H. Tabachnick, "Rawls & Contract Law" (with Kevin A. Kordana), 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (March 2005).
David H. Tabachnick, "Tax and the Philosopher?s Stone" (reviewing Murphy & Nagel, The Myth of Ownership) (with Kevin A. Kordana), 89 Va. L. Rev. 647 (2003).
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Ayca Boylu, Philosophy as a Way of Life, (in Turkish), a collection edited with Steve Voss, with a preface by Steve Voss, forthcoming.
Elizabeth Fenton, "Dispensing with Liberty: Conscientious Refusal and the 'Morning-After' Pill" (with Loren Lomasky) forthcoming in the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
Luke Gregory, “Ronald Dworkin, T.H. Green, and the Communal Theory of Political Obligation" forthcoming in Social Theory and Practice, vol. 32, no. 2 (April 2006).
Jason Megill, ‘Easy's Getting Harder All the Time: The Computational Theory and Affective States,’ Ratio 2005.
Jason Megill, "Locke's Mysterianism: On the Unsolvability of the Mind-Body Problem," forthcoming in Locke Studies (2006).
Jason Megill, "Are We Paraconsistent? On the Lucas-Penrose Argument and the Computational Theory of Mind," Auslegung, Vol 27, no.1, Spring/Summer 2004.
Jason Megill, "What Role Do the Emotions Play in Cognition?" Consciousness and Emotion, Vol. 4:1 (2003), 83-102.
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