COMPARATIVE POLITICS COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION AUGUST 1999
SECTION I ANSWER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
A. What is the 'small-n problem ..? Is it a problem? I fnot, why not, and if so, what are the solutions?
B. "Quantitative cross-national comparisons of many countries have found consistently n positive correlation between development and democracy. They thus come to relatively optimistic conclusions about the chances of democracy in the developing countries of today. By contrast, comparative historical studies that emphasae qualitative examination of complex sequences tend to trace the rise of democracy to a favorable historical constellation of conditions in early capitalism. Their conclusions are therefore far more pessimistic about today s developing countries."
Given contrasting methodologies, is tt possible to find corroborating evidence for inconsistent theories? If so, how do we resolve this problem? Discuss this matter in the context of one major area of theorizing in comparative politics
SECTION II ANSWER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
A. What, if anything, is the relevance of the grand sociological theories of the 19th and early 20th centuries (Marx, Weber, and perhaps others) to the study of comparative politics in the late 20th century?
B. Rational choice theory and "historical institutionalism" are often separately used to explain the same or very similar political outcomes, such as the design if significant policies, or major features of bureaucracies or party systems. But do rational choice arguments implicitly rely on -- as their original causal Factors-- the same background structures on which historical institutionalises place so much emphasis? If so, what if anything does the rationalist framework and its explicit assumptions contribute to the overall analysis? If not, what is the contribution of historical institutionalism?
SECTION III ANSWER TWO OFTHEEOLLOWINGQUESTIONS
A. Does a revolution differ from other forms of political change, violence, or upheaval`? Examine several influential theories of revolution with respect to at least two cases.
B. O'Donnell and Schmntter claim that after 1941 it became impossible for authoritarian regimes to legitimate themselves. Yet a ,gnificantnumber of authoritarian regimes in different regions have resisted the "Third Wave" of democratization since the 1970's. What theoretical approach best allows us to begin explaining divergent regime outcomes m either the Americas, Africa, the Former USSR. the Middle East, or East Asia?
C. The assumption of much political economy theorizing is that late industrialization requires a strong interventionist state. In an era of globalization and liberalization, it is widely suggested that intervention has been sharply curtailed. If this is tine, what does this mean for theories about industrialization m developing countries? Does a mean drat while developing countries can now stabilize (heir economies in the short-term, they will be unable to industrialize over the long-term?
D. Adam Yrzeworski distinguishes democracy from authoritarianism by arguing that the former "institutionalizes uncertainty.' Assess the plausibility and usefulness of this distinction and description for explaining regime changes and outcomes m at least two cases.
E. Critically consider theories linking tax structures to the development of the modem state. He sure to consider (a) theories which emphasize taxation as opposed to other theories of modem states, and (b) whether theories of taxation explain differences between modern states.
F. Britain's single member district plurality electoral system has been described as that nation's "efficient secret" In what sense can electoral systems be described as "efficient"? What types of differences can make a specific electoral system experience different degrees of efficiency (at achieving the same goal) m two countries? Develop your arguments with reference to at least two cases.