May 2005
This “closed-book” (i.e., no notes/books/computer
files) examination is designed to test your knowledge of and ability to
synthesize the complete field of international relations. The best answers will respond directly to the
question chosen and demonstrate a broad understanding of the literature on and
processes of international relations. They will show the commonalities across and
gaps between the different theoretical approaches, and the evolution of debates
in and across those approaches. They
will deploy meaningful historical evidence in support of their arguments. Theoretical or empirical overlap between your
answers will diminish the quality of your exam.
(Note as well that citing UVa faculty, especially gratuitously, will not
help your grade.)
“Majors” should answer one question from each of the three parts of the exam.
“Minors” should answer one question from Part I, and one question from either Part II or Part III. Majors have
six hours, and minors have four hours to complete the exam. You have the choice either to type your exam,
or to write it out by hand. If you
choose the latter, make a clear photocopy and give us the original at the end
of the allotted time. Then type up the
exam word-for-word from the handwritten version (although you can correct spelling and
small grammatical mistakes) and hand in the typed version within twenty-four
hours. Include a signed pledge that the
typed version is identical to the handwritten version.
Part I: Theory of International
Relations
1.
Although the international system is anarchic, states seem to adhere to rules
even when no superior power is enforcing them. Why do they do so?
2.
“Constructivist IR theory has made little progress since the late 1980s. The fundamental reason why is
constructivists' own ambivalence or confusion about what they are doing: viz., are they explaining, or (thickly)
describing, international phenomena?”
Discuss.
3.
Many scholars point to the importance of
synthetic theory. In what ways might a research program incorporate material
power and ideas yet not fall prone to Lakatosian paradigm degeneration? Discus, building off examples and weaknesses
in the existing literature.
4.
“When all is said and done, structural realism remains the only viable
theoretical paradigm for understanding international relations. Only realism deals with non-contingent
variables and the constant fact of the international anarchy.” Do you agree?
Why or why not?
Part
II—Applications to Issues
1. To what extent (if so) does the end of the
cold war and the peaceful collapse of both European communism and the Soviet
Union, 1987-1991, expose realist (and neo-realist) theories of international
relations as unnecessarily limited in both analytical focus and predictive
capacity?
2. “The
‘Asian values’ debate on human rights represents a flawed attempt to make a
sound general point, namely that human rights are essentially a Western
imposition on the developing world designed mainly to salve Western consciences
and not to address third-world realities.”
Discuss.
3. Why have powerful states like the United
States and China apparently had such a difficult time in persuading a weak
state, North Korea, to forego the development of nuclear weapons? What general, or theoretical, lessons, if
any, can we draw about the dynamics of
nuclear proliferation from this case?
4. “Given uncertainty about the European
constitution and the admission of Turkey, celebrations of the enlargement of
the European Union have proven to be premature.
Even in this primarily economic and functional arena, European states
have shown themselves to be unable to provide an effective counterweight to the
power of the United States.” Do you
agree? Has the war in Iraq made any
difference?
5. According to
some, because globalization encourages interdependence and a common set of
interests and values, its overall effects are positive. Others believe that globalization undermines distinctive
cultures, rewards wasteful consumption in rich countries, and incites violence
in poor and undemocratic countries. How do we make sense of these different
dynamics? Which in your view is likely to dominate? Please answer
using two
different countries, one developed and one developing.
6. “Concern about the leadership of the World
Bank is beside the point: the dominant economic powers have no real intention
of providing Third World countries with open access to their markets. And without this access, development aid has
only the most marginal impact on economic development.” Discuss.
Part III—Regional and Area Foreign
Policies
1. “The domestic characteristics of powerful
nations are utterly irrelevant for understanding their behavior.
Powerful states always strive to maximize
their power, whether military or economic.”
Do you agree? Construct your answer
around a discussion of the literature about a specific region.
2. Some believe that nation-states often have
particular, sometimes unique, enduring traits that shape their behavior in
world politics. Others argue that states
are basically empty vessels guided by the fluctuating dictates of charismatic leaders,
economic demands, or international circumstances. Who is right?
Make your argument with reference to the literature of a specific
country or region.
3. Compare the evolution of Russian foreign
policy, 1992-2005 with that of Soviet foreign policy, 1917-1924: What does this
comparison tell us about the relative influence of systemic versus unit-level
factors in Soviet/Russian foreign policy as well as in international relations
more generally?
4. The world capitalist system inexorably
forces all states, especially those in the developing world, to organize
markets in ways that serve the interests of global capital. Do you agree or disagree? Discuss with reference to the ways the
process has played out in at least two specific developing nations.
5. Some
scholars point to a fundamental shift in American politics towards the sunbelt
and conservative actors as central to shaping contemporary foreign policy.
Others argue that U.S. strategy is a product, not of internal politics, but
instead America's unique unipolar power position. Who is right?
6. “American hopes to foster democratization in
the Middle East, however well-intentioned, will always give way to the security
and balance-of-power imperatives of the region.
In fact the whole ‘push toward democratization’ is merely an ideological
disguise for an US policy aimed at quasi-imperial domination.” Discuss.
7. Which theoretical paradigm in IR theory seems
to you best to explain China’s foreign policy?
Or is the rise in Chinese power
and influence mainly an inevitable function of its economic growth? If so, does
this mean that literature of
international political economy is better equipped than
‘traditional’ IR theory (especially in
its preoccupation with military security) to explain the dynamics in play?