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AGGREGATING DEMANDS AND PROCLAIMING DECISIONS:
Bargaining and Command at High Executive Levels¹

Administration: The Official Presumption of Command

Policy and, to some degree program, are the decisions likely to be articulated at the highest levels. Information, money and sometimes force will be disposed or used in order to achieve what is desired. The giving and receiving of executive direction engages chief executives ("President," "Prime Minister," "General Secretary," "Pope") executive entourages (sometimes called "staff"), and the operating entities to

¹. Adapted from an earlier paper prepared with the assistance of Kirsten Nakjavani. Earlier versions of this chapter were previously published as Bargaining and Command and Command in the Administrative Process, I: Chief Executives and Executive Entourages, Charlottesville, VA, 22903, USA: Institute of Government, University of Virginia, Working Papers in Public Administration, No. 2, 1986; and, "Bargaining and Command by Heads of U.S. Government Departments," Social Science Journal, 25:3 (1988), 255-276.

perform the ultimate work: "departments," "ministries," "boards," or "commissions."

Modern office architecture symbolizes the theory of classical public administration. Authority is in layers and the bosses are on the top floors. They are the "higher-ups" (leaders) who cannot peacefully be displaced by "underlings" (their subordinates). Moreover, when it comes to deciding what to do, when to do it, or how to do it, leaders do not have to consult subordinates. They decide ". . . substantially. . . when, in what conditions, and with whom consultation takes place."² The administrative hierarchy presumes official command. The person at the first level ("chief executive") may issue absolute commands. Administrative theory and research has brought the command model under intense criticism, especially since the behavioral upsurge of the 1950s. The preferred term is "executive leadership." The idea of executive leadership--as normally used--seems to demand that the top person behave in such a way that all the subordinate people will cheerfully put

². Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1953,

their mind and energies to work in accomplishing the goal.³ The architectural model of the formal organization is inexact. The executives must discover and cope with the real or working organization. The task can never be fully accomplished. The working or real organization is, in Bert Rockman's brilliantly suggestive word, "restless."⁴

It is not too hard to find some executive situations that are almost pure command. On the other hand, chief executives sometimes have imperfect latitude to "decide when, in what conditions, and with whom consultation takes place." They must tolerate much more consultation with subordinates than they had intended. The resultant is bargaining, although the word "bargaining" is often thought unseemly when we speak of relations between superiors and subordinates. Such bargaining

³. Burns, James MacGregor. Leadership, New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 369-385, contains a particularly perceptive discussion on the subject of "executive leadership." However, Burns's primary concern is more with executive leadership in the whole political system real than with the internal features of the administrative process. Burns believes that the President of the United States should lead and Congress should follow. He is not particularly concerned with the problem of leadership within the executive process, although the sheer logic of his position would seem to lead to an acceptance of a command model. It is important to note, however, that this is not the focus of his discussion.

⁴. Rockman, Bert A. The Leadership Question, New York: Praeger, 1984, 155.

may be explicit, though more often it is tacit.⁵ It is manifest in transactions (threats, commands, promises, evasions, reasoned arguments, etc.). These transactions will take place amongst chief executives and their entourages -- sometimes called "staff," chief executives and their secretaries or ministers, the entourage and secretaries or ministers, between parallel secretaries or ministers, between the members of the chief executive's entourage, between members of the entourage and subordinates of the various agencies, and between department heads (secretaries or ministers and people who are their official subordinates). They will also necessarily extend to people outside the executive structure, in interest groups, political parties, legislative bodies, or other parts of the social world.


Proposition 1. Reality is not bargaining or command, but a permanent tension between them. If we imagine the line 0-1 to represent a see-saw, with A as the fulcrum,

⁵. On tacit bargaining, see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, 22-46.

there is a repeated tendency for effective
decisional authority to slide from one end
toward the other.

Figure 10

Concentration of Decisional Power



Even in military matters, where the presumption of command is strongest, we have much evidence of bargaining.⁶ Subordinates of any degree, with varying degrees of frequency, do things that their formal superiors would not have authorized, if they had known beforehand, nor would have directed if they had been

⁶. The powerful series of studies by Michael Armacost, Demetrios Caraley, Warner Schilling, Samuel Huntington and others, under the impact of William T. R. Fox, leaves no room for believing the command is the normal process. Also, Cf., McGeorge Bundy, The Strength of Government. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

asked, nor would have done if they themselves had been acting. The measure of imperfect hierarchy is in the role of the subordinate who is responsible to higher authority and theoretically obliged to assure that other people (subordinates) carry out the instructions and requirements that they have been given.⁷

Some part of the capacity to give direction from the center, and to receive intelligently responses from the periphery, is a function of the motivations to which subordinates are responsive, regardless of the structure. Why are there disagreements and divergences? If there are several minds at work on the same problem, then there will be several answers offered, except under unusual circumstances where the ground rules or premises of decision can be specified perfectly. The reasons that subordinate decision-makers deviate from what might have been predicted on the basis of the premises of the decision-makers may reasonably be classified as threefold: individual, technical, and "strategic-tactical."⁸

Incentives to Command

⁷. Above, Chapter II, pp.

⁸. Below, Chapter 5, pp. - .

Proposition 2. Bargaining and command relationships are influenced by chief executives' disposition and by objective capacity.

Proposition 3. Chief executives may be driven to attempt to assert command, or to allow bargaining. There are unpredictable acts based upon the person who occupies the chief executive role at the time.

The act of choosing is individually based upon his or her definition of the situation⁹

⁹ Richard C. Snyder, Henry W. Bruck, and Burton M. Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, has an elaborate discussion of "definition of the situation." I have found that work very helpful, although it has not yet had the penetration it might have deserved in social science, partly because I suspect it is too complex and combines too many aspects of social science to sit well with impatient desire for bold and conclusive theory.

Joel Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, "Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy," American Political Science Review 70: (June 1976), 456-468, do not use the "definition of the situation" language. But their discussion of Richard M. Nixon's approach effectively incorporates that form of analysis.

The incentives to command may be quite powerful. They may arise from the very personality of the actor. Or they may arise from some perceived personal threat or affront, whether to the particular actor or the actor's concept of the grandeur of the office. Some decisions, notably those involving real or perceived crisis, appear to decision-makers as virtually dictating command. What chief executives see as crises tend to project them into minute details, both on matters involving very small numbers of people and those involving actual war or the threat of conflagration. President Harry Truman was intensely and immediately engaged in the 1950 crisis precipitated by the invasion of South Korea, and in the decision by the United States to respond militarily.¹⁰ Theodore Sorenson's and Senator Robert Kennedy's President Kennedy was similarly engaged in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, down to the most intimate details,¹¹ although he accepted in part his brother's advice to absent himself from group discussions because people would not speak their minds freely in his presence.¹² President Ford made

¹⁰. Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, New York: Free Press, 1968.

¹¹.

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a personal decision that he would be the center of control in the Mayaguez episode, which had not the same threat level as the Korean invasion, let alone the Cuban crisis.¹³

President Reagan's decision to interrupt the flow of supplies contracted for the Soviet pipeline appears to have been a free choice. In all these cases, chief executives act as if the decision-making choices were free of electoral necessity, the desires of friends and allies, or inconvenient complexity.

In some cases, there is, and probably can be, no important or reliable preparatory structure for free choices. Policy analysis makes little difference, and bureaucratic structures simply must adapt.

Proposition 4: Whatever the disposition to exert command, the action will also be a reflection of the actor's possession of the requisites for coercion, if there is resistance.

Human Weakness as the Basic Inducement

¹³. Richard G. Head, Frisco W. Short and Robert C. McFarlane, Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision-Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978,

The basic inducement that promotes a tacit bargain with subordinates is the inevitable division of labor. The division is born of human weakness. The commander cannot be everywhere at once, doing everything at once--although persons vary in their willingness to try.

Proposition 5. Chief executives accept some bargaining and allow subordinates to do some of what subordinates want, contrary to their own preferences, because chief executives inherently have more to do than they can master personally.¹⁴

Human perception of this necessity is recorded in the Biblical dialogue of Moses, and his father-in-law, Jethro.

. . . Moses took his seat to administer justice for the people and from morning till evening they stood around him.

Observing what labours he took on himself for the people's sake, the father-in-law of Moses said to him, 'Why do you take all this on yourself for the people? Why sit here alone with the people standing around you from morning till evening?'¹⁵

Moses explained that the people brought their inquiries to him as to God, and that he settled their disputes and explained God's statutes and decisions. Jethro pointed out that Moses could not do it alone. He should represent the people before God, bring their disputes to him, teach them the statutes and decisions.

But choose from the people at large some capable and God-fearing men, trustworthy and incorruptible, and appoint them as leaders of the people; leaders of thousands, hundreds, fifties, tens.

¹⁵. Exodus 18:13-15 (Jerusalem Bible).

Let these be at the service of the people to render justice at all times. They can refer all difficult questions to you, but all smaller questions they will decide for themselves, so making things easier for you and sharing the burden with you.¹⁶

¹⁶. Ibid., 21-22.

The same idea is represented in the New Testament account of how the office of deacon was created. The account is that amongst the early Christians in Jerusalem, Greek-speaking Jews from outside Palestine (Hellenists) and Palestinian Jews fell into dispute about the daily distribution of food to widows.¹⁷ This is the account repeated in writing of Richard Hooker in late 16h century England. Hooker says:

¹⁷. Acts of the Apostles, 6:1.

The ancient custom of the Church was to yield the poor much relief especially widows. But as poor people are always querulous and apt to think themselves less respected than they should be, we see that when the Apostles did what they could without hindrance to their weightier business yet there which grudged that others had too much and they too little, the Grecian widows shorter commons than the Hebrews.¹⁸

¹⁸. Richard Hooker, Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1954 printing, Book V, Chapter LXVIII, 436.

This inter-group dispute distracted the Apostles from the "weightier business" of teaching and establishing churches, and thus deacons were appointed to take care of the managerial business.¹⁹ This same necessity for delegation and change in structure is shown in the reformation of command structures as European armies got so large that the commander could not be highly visible to all, and thus give truly personal leadership to all, the troops.²⁰

The human being has some limits beyond which the stress is not tolerable.²¹ Subordinates take up part of the load. In return, they are permitted to decide many things, including some where the formal pretense is that only the chief executive can decide. The "division of labor" is not mechanistic, but moral, physiological, and psychological. (Frederick Winslow Taylor's "scientific management" recognizes the division of labor's consequences, by the effort to centralize knowledge so as to overcome the power that the division of labor allows lower-level

¹⁹. Acts 6:36-6; and, Hooker, op. cit., 434-436.

²⁰. John Keegan and Richard Holmes, Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle, New York: Elisabeth Sifton Books-Viking, 1986, 211.

²¹. Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960,

functionaries.²²⁾

Decisional problems are the source of headaches and other ailments. That is why we can see their consequences in the physical deterioration of public persons. The public photographs of political leaders, over a series of years, are profoundly indicative. Chief executives may be more highly motivated than the rest of us, but not physically stronger.²³ I will, having heard this point articulated by none other, call this the Huitt principle of exhaustion. The late Ralph Huitt said that "the President of the United States is a man,²⁴ and has no more hours in the day than any other man." Huitt went on to make the point that the President may be motivated, and thus may work harder, but he has "no more good hours" than anyone else.²⁵ The reduction of biological and psychological demand upon themselves is, then, one of the major reasons that chief executives will effectively yield some of their powers of

²². Frederick Winslow Taylor, Scientific Management, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947, 15.

²³. Old end note 15, of which none exists.

²⁴. The use of language has changed, and it necessary to say that Huitt's address had nothing to do with gender roles.

²⁵. Address to the Wisconsin Political Science Association, , 1970. So far as I know, this address was never published formally, although I heard the address, having attended the dinner meeting with my then-colleague at University of Wisconsin-Madison, Professor Clara Penniman.

decision, even when they disguise from themselves that they have done so. As they operate under more than normal psychological pressure, they want people around them to make them feel comfortable. The result is a tripartite entourage: friends-and-peers ("cronies"), ambitious younger people, and migratory technocrats.

The Chief Executive and the Entourage: A Critical Bargain

Proposition 5.1: In large scale government, the next critical bargain -- more implicit than explicit -- concerns how much the chief executive will yield powers of decision to the executive entourage.²⁶

If the government is not "too large," the critical bargain is between the chief executive and his or her principal operational subordinates. But there is some point at which chief executives cannot effectively supervise the subordinates responsible for the operating entities ("departments," "ministries," etc.) on a continuing basis. The bargain with the entourage is critical in large-scale government.

Friends and peers are safety valves, as people whom the

²⁶ . Old end note 17, of which none exists.

chief

executive knows well enough to judge their reactions, and as people who may be presumed to seek nothing for themselves. The more the chief executive must put personal friendships aside, the more he or she will value the few that remain. Ambitious younger people have their unique value in getting diligent servants. They come equipped with enthusiasm, zealous obedience, ambition, and school taught techniques. Their professed loyalty to the chief is passionate, and their operating style toward all others will be pre-emptory. Migratory technocrats offer special advice and information that is neither purely technical nor purely political. They are similar to the political technocrats who migrated from court to court and country to country in the 17th and 18th centuries.

Proposition 5.2: Protocol simultaneously
reflects and reinforces status.

The entourage judges when departure from the formal protocol will be essential or disastrous. This is acutely important for the chief executive offices, for what is apparent over time is a tendency for such offices to be further reinforced with protocol criteria. Deference due to the office,

is transferred to the person of the officeholder. Adults in the presence of the officeholder are excessively reticent or excessively anxious to establish familiarity. (Protocol has other aspects, as we shall see, when one is concerned with the department heads.) The entourage is the gatekeeper. The entourage regulates the use of time and the manner in which others may encroach on that time.

The function is important because the person who wants to come and see the chief executive will be bringing news that the chief executive "already knows," finds boring, or does not want to know. If the problem is admitted to be "real," then the person who wants to come in is likely to be criticized for not taking care of the problem "out there." He or she will be said not to be "doing the job." The entourage manages a variety of other protocols. The protocols of space are fundamental to human organization, since they indicate who has a right to be where. One of the first and most visible indicators of control, is seen in any social function where an important official is present. The traffic flow around that person is seldom, if ever, random. This may be a matter of self control. But protocol is structured so that the traffic flow around that

person is never random. The entourage, wherever it exists, helps to regulate the flow. The entourage also helps to interpret an elaborate set of rules regarding the square footage of office space, whether the office is on an interior or exterior location, whether it has carpets, rugs, or vinyl floors, refrigerators, personal washrooms, or private dining spaces.

One of the crucial functions of the entourage is to provide good clues as to what lies in the world beyond the agency. In any country with a free press, the official, if he or she is wise, will read newspapers closely. They provide clues as to the storms and the opportunities in the environment. It does not matter if the official is the chief executive, some department head, or another kind of official altogether. But it is quite easy to start the day and be absorbed in important meetings for several hours. Who is to come in and whisper or pass a note about a major story that the Post--"the best inter-office memorandum in Washington"--has just gotten for tomorrow?

This clue-searching is part of the function of the entourage. Moreover, clue-searching extends to liaison with people outside the organization, including people who have

little to do with the official functions but have some sentimental or organizational connection with having promoted the political person to the point at which he or she now stands. People have had some role in one's attaining a high and visible position, are likely to feel entitled to the courtesy of a little courtesy! In different places and times, the groups that have the most respected claims on the organization will vary. The policy mystique accepted by most college-educated Americans is "non-partisan." Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officers might even be subject to criticism if they paid much attention to partisan groups, nonetheless they do not wholly ignore such groups. The Reagan Administration's people seem notably attuned to the groups associated with the "conservative political movement." The non-partisan mystique is so strong in other countries. Both party and the interest groups are treated quite seriously by the British government departments.

Internal scanning is desirable. The chief executive surely wants to know whether he or she has subordinates still connected to some hostile political grouping or to some prior history of the public issues. There is always additional information--sometimes only in the memory of a human being--that the

political appointee might find useful. Sometimes, immediate subordinates seek to obscure information because they regard it as genuinely trivial, and think it would be just a waste of the political official's time if he paid any attention to it. Sometimes, the career officials just do not know about the information that is there for someone to know.

The entourage initiates, and sometimes carries out, action in which the department head may not be cooperative. It may even be action that the chief executive or the entourage do not wish the department head to know. The entourage also restricts or precludes action that the department head wants but the chief executive may find incompatible. The entourage is, finally, some version of an inspectorate, find out about the performance and activities of departments and department heads -- often in ways of which these departments and department heads have little cognizance, and to prevented what is deemed objectionable.

The entourage is also the disciplinarian. When a Cabinet officer has been a nay-sayer once too often, someone will decide it is time to dump him or her. The President is not going to say that "X was just too plain-spoken for me." No. The President, or more likely the entourage, will leak the word

that X is disloyal, X is unable to command the troops and has "gone native" in the Department, or that X just does not serve the President well. Finally, the entourage, in particular, may be oriented to the kind of advice that school-taught policy analysts often cannot quite fathom. It must be sufficiently good technically as to be worth trying, capable of being done, possible of being done in that particular organization, and not likely to explode land mines that are not less injurious for having been "logically irrelevant" to the problem.

Some variant of the entourage is to be found in virtually every political system about which I have read. Whereas the "political" feature of "White House staff" is subject to much commentary, I find little recognition that the Prime Minister has a somewhat different formation, based apparently upon the role of the civil Service.²⁷

In exchange for extending the chief executive's reach, members of the entourage are able to exert influence in the world by gaining a reputation for having access to the center. They are understood to be people who can influence the chief executive's mind behind closed doors. However, they also become

themselves decision-makers whom the chief executive will make little or not effort to review or overrule.

Proposition 5.3: The bargain between the chief executive and members of the entourage is inherently unstable.

The chief executive and most members of the entourage do not, in reality, know each other. Most members of the entourage are rather remote from the chief executive. The chief executive cannot be assured what is being said or done under his (her) authority is something he (she) would do if acting originally

People acting in the chief executive's name, purporting to act so, or allowing themselves to be believed to act so, may go well beyond any claim of authority until challenged.

Proposition 5.4: Entourage politics becomes a more intensively competitive process of personal power than nearly any other part of the governmental process.

In this process, the chief executive's friends and peers will become a center of storms. The reason is that they are threats to all other participants. At the same time, they have

²⁷. Old end note 16, of which none exists.

a certain vulnerability that derives from their security. They have their own standing in life. They cannot long absorb the ego punishment that being around the chief executive may require. Moreover, the high-level, full-time, senior staff--emergent from servants and technocrats--will resent their easier access to the chief executive. They must thus seek to push them out of the process.

Within the entourage, there is a recurrent process in which the participants try--often in a very quiet way--to control the agenda by controlling what the chief executive will want to hear. Clark Clifford has been quoted as saying that amongst Truman advisers, in the first years of the new President's succession, there was a liberal-conservative "struggle" for Mr. Truman's mind. Clifford was, so this story goes, not even sure that Mr. Truman ever realized this was going on. The story may be apocryphal. However, it illustrates the concept of a potential "capturing" of a President or of any other chief executive.²⁸ If the entourage were always successful, no one

²⁸. Check this. Does it really have to do with this point? Seems unlikely. Sayre, Wallace S. and Kaufman, Herbert. Governing New York City, New York: Sage Publications, 1960, 251-262.

outside the entourage would ever be able to appeal an entourage decision and win.

Proposition 5.5: Politics within the entourage must depend largely on face-to-face relations.



It follows from what we have been saying that adversaries and colleagues are identical, and much action occurs in a small space.²⁹ People within the entourage must work together, literally. The members of the group must maintain the stance of a common interest and fate. Yet there is inevitable conflict. In the White House Mess adversaries come and go, all within a few minutes of each other, between order and salad, salad and entree, entree and dessert. The strain on judgment, psyche, and intestinal tract must be fierce. Life is framed by the potentiality of a fall from grace.

Proposition 5.6: Personal dependence
imposes a demand for loyalty to the
incumbent of the office at the moment.

Doubt as to "loyalty," however grounded, is both a severe impediment and an instrument in the war of one adviser against another.

Proposition 5.7: The award or signs of
honor and station are inducements, as shame
and humiliation, the opposites of honor and
station, are among the most powerful

penalties.

If shame and insult may be used to make people feel uncomfortable about themselves, because of what they have internalized, they are easily effective. Control over status symbols is an important factor, much neglected in our thinking. Access to the President's plane is surely a sign of honor, as is the fact of repeated invitations to a Camp David weekend. Dahl and Lindblom cite a report in which an administrator during World War II was obsessed with the importance of getting a rug. He appropriated one, and found it too large for his office. He cut in it half, only then to find that it had been allocated for the assistant administrator of his agency, who outranked him.³⁰ But this absurdity began from an exercise in realism.

There are many "small" things of which one cannot credibly be deprived without loss of standing. In government, meetings to which you are not invited are also a critical symbol of the status you do not have.

Imagine the economist, or the corporate executive, who has been recruited to Washington, and must go home to tell friends

³⁰. Robert A.Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 196?,

and associates, "I have really have nothing important to do. I really don't know anything."³¹ If you have no car, when everyone else who attends has official transportation, it will be self-evident that you count for less in the system. If an agency head can command the space required, or personnel to perform your operations, he or she will be immobilized. The person who cannot get a secretary when various people of even lesser rank can easily get secretaries, is an essential outsider whose weakness cannot be disguised.³²

Proposition 5.8: If shame and humiliation will not cause the individual to conform within the entourage, or to withdraw altogether, they may be used to deprive that person of credit before the rest of the world.

Among the repeated forms of stigma are allegations of moral dereliction, ethical failure which repeatedly is a cover term for financial misadventure, or incompetence. Indeed, the order of listing is essentially the order in which these charges have

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had their most profound stigmatic effect. It is not necessary to prove anything, but merely to spread the idea that someone has violated the established public morality, whatever that may be.

Claims of "corruption" or self-enrichment have also been important weapons in the fight and remain so. "Incompetence" has become a tool only the last two hundred years or so, when the idea of competence in government has become especially compelling. It was the weapon used in the first Reagan Administration, against the private advisers ("kitchen cabinet"). The elderly gentlemen from California, who had known the President as "Ronnie," neither possessed nor wanted the competence to work within governmental procedures. The servants and technocrats in the government could generate criticism precisely for that reason, sufficient to make it costly for the President to allow his ties to them to be as evident as before.

Proposition 6. The stabilization of
jurisdiction provides relief from combat.

The claiming of jurisdiction works against friends and peers, and for the others. Control over other people's access to the higher authorities is a well established method of

political combat within the entourage. The claiming jurisdiction reduces the personal element substantially. Jurisdiction has to be stabilized.

Proposition 6.1: The conversion of personal servants into officials with defined functions is an endless process in government.

Modern bureaucracy reflects the continual emergence, from the household, roles that become translated into official entities of government.³³ If "personal" services repeatedly prove useful to Presidents, for instance, they will become institutional. The result, in the American case, is that today the institutional functions still are best described in Neustadt's terms: "so-called 'staff' facilities around the President, [. . .] an odd assortment of personal and institutional staffs and of interagency committees."³⁴

Proposition 6.2: Institutionalization redefines the chief executive-entourage bargain to the advantage of the latter.

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The reason is that institutionalization turns the functionary's ability to act from the mere personal approval of the chief executive to a duty of office. The office does things without which the chief executive cannot do, and which the chief executive cannot define exclusively, as has come to be the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Chief of Staff.

The entourage--whether personal or institutional--claims standing in the governmental world as the unique representative of the chief executive. However, the agencies that constitute "working" part of the governmental system are the primary entities within which the necessary action occurs. In most modern governments, these entities are the departments.

Proposition 7. Between the entourage and the agencies, bargaining and command are ever regenerated.

The entourage may act strictly as the central executive's agent, although there is a natural tendency for it to go into business on its own. The entourage is, from the department head's perspective, nor an institution with a normative claim on their loyalties. It is a power fact, to be deferred to when necessary, ignored when possible. If even most members of the

chief executive's entourage are not particularly well known to the chief executive, then self-protection will be the norm on which the entourage acts. The entourage will encourage--not restrain--demands for conformity.

Department Heads, Executives, and Entourages

Proposition 8: The department head is unique as the actor who must simultaneously work as the chief executive's subordinate and as the superior official in an organization where other people may resist or accept command.

Proposition 8.1: The permanent tension between command over subordinates and bargaining with subordinates is more intense at the department head's level, than at any other. The reason is that both the nominal superiors and the nominal subordinates have the ability to impose punitive sanctions.

Department heads ("line administrators") must meet two key problems: coping with ("manipulation of") the external

environment and getting internal control.³⁵ The chief executive and the chief executive's entourage are crucial parts of the department's environment. Department heads sometimes must accept command from the chief executive. But they also have to assert some measure of bargaining upward. If department heads want freedom from intervention from above, they must show that they can assert command below. If the department head is thought to be able to control the department, then the chief executive is more likely to allow such latitude. And if that happens, the entourage has little excuse to intervene. The assertion of command might depend upon simple compulsive power. In principle, the same resources that are available to chief executives might be available, within lesser limits, to department heads: inquiry, investigation, material payment, reward by prestige, withdrawal of material payment, withdrawal of public esteem.

At the same time, the department heads looks downward to the subordinate, to see what can or will be accomplished, without loss to morale and loyalty -- and sometimes even at pain

³⁵ King, Anthony (ed.), The British Prime Minister, London: Macmillan, 1985,

of loss of morale and loyalty.

Department heads are continually pressed to do things that the entourage wants. Ambiguity is inevitable. Many of the people who have to deal with these members of the entourage may suspect that the chief executive does not know what is said in his name. Suspecting and knowing are different, and the price of losing a gamble can be very high. If the aide has lied and created a problem, is it wise to challenge the inform the chief executive, unless you can convince the chief executive and displace the aide?

1. The Chief Executive's Power: Hazard Criteria

Department heads sometimes submit when the chief executive has both impractical. Command is sometimes accepted, however, in the most genuine sense. Even if it is not, formal obedience is displayed, when the chief executive holds the department head at a great degree of hazard.

Proposition 8.2: There are four hazard
criteria --appointment, removal,
instruction, reorganization.

But the Prime Minister has greater and more stable powers of command than does the American President. Ministerial

appointment is mainly at the discretion of the Prime Minister.³⁶ An American President must often share the appointment power with senators, in order to secure confirmation of a nominee in the Senate, sometimes must share the power with others who have the effective ability to block what the President first puts forth. The minister in office lives a career at the hazard of the Prime Minister,³⁷ with few political options if he or she should be forced to resign. American Cabinet officers may resign, with no sign of anger, merely to seek a better opportunity. They may even be fired, and still have viable political futures. The chief executive may have the right, and effective ability, to tell the department head what policies to follow or what procedures to follow. The Prime Minister has sweeping powers to transfer functions from one minister to

³⁶. Kaufman, Gerald. How to Be A Minister, London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980. The subject matter of this informed, but casual, observation is treated in a good deal of scholarly literature. Also, see Brian Sedgmore, The Secret Constitution: An Analysis of the Political Establishment. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1980, 62. There is a useful treatment, en passant, in Richard Hodder-Williams and James Ceaser (ed.), Politics in Britain and the United States Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986, particularly in the essays by Jorgen Rasmussen ("Executive and Legislative Roles," 1-27) and Hugh Hecllo ("Whitehall and Washington Revisited," 88-118).

³⁷. Alderman R.K. and Cross J.A., The Tactics of Resignation, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, 48-53

another, or to dissolve departments entirely.³⁸ This is known to the British as "machinery of government" changes. It is "closed politics," played out before the Prime Minister as an audience of one,³⁹ with the Cabinet Secretary as his adviser, the minister involved only if the Prime Minister consents, and the Cabinet nowhere in sight. Preemptive reorganization reveals what most political scientists and historians have yet to recognize. The glamorous features of politics manifest its theatrical quality, but as a general proposition the relationships that allow some A to dominate some B are, psychodynamics apart, dependent upon intricate details that only specialists want to know. Power is boring. Preemptive reorganization, all the same, involves an ability to act for which American Presidents would nearly weep. The possibilities of executive reorganization in the United States are so much weaker.⁴⁰ The sole exception, of which one simply cannot speak

³⁸. Pollitt, Christopher. Manipulating the Machine Changing the Pattern of Ministerial Departments. 1960-1983. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984 is the most compelling account of government reorganization that I have seen in recent times with an empirical base.

³⁹. Lord Snow, Science and Government. New York: New American Library, 1962,

⁴⁰. Salamon, Lester (ed.). Federal Reorganization: What Have We Learned, Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 198?, is a collection of essays containing various empirical observations and

for lack of any knowledge, would seem to relate to secret intelligence organizations that may be contained within the Government.. It seems obvious to me that there is a great need for better understanding of how the secret intelligence agencies are controlled and directed, how their internal disputes are handled, and so forth. I do not claim familiarity with the range of scholarly research on this subject, and it may be that ground has been more than adequately covered, though I am always skeptical that that is so on any important topic. Some foundation has been laid in the early work of Harry Ransom.⁴¹ In completing this volume, I have not tried to absorb systematically the experience of the past six or seven years and all the experience generally designated as "Iran-Contra." However, I do take note here of current topical interest by such material as has been released about the relationship of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Iran-contra process and by

normative assessments.

The most extensive reportage of the details of reorganization in the American Federal government was in the work of the late Herbert Emmerich. See, Essays on Federal Reorganization, University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 19??; and Federal Reorganization and Administrative Management and, in Frederick C. Mosher, Government Reorganization.

the rather dramatic assertions offered in by Peter Wright⁴² or by Bob Woodward.⁴³ Neither author, no matter how well informed, presents evidence that could sustain the assertions made. The assertions may be true, but there is no basis in the record available to rest of us to evaluate them.⁴⁴

The chief executive in each country has a vast measure of power. The Prime Minister controls both the "front end" and the "back end" of the political life cycle.

2. Limits to chief executive power: department heads' inducements

The ambition to protect one's own reputation is sooner or later a potent factor that induces department heads to act independently. The reason lies in the very fact that such strong demands for loyalty are placed upon them, but there are no reciprocal promises. "Every friend in power," Henry Adams wrote, "is a friend lost." He continued, "This rule is so nearly absolute that it may be taken in practice as admitting no

⁴². Spycatcher. New York: Viking, 1987

⁴³. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA. 1981-1987. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.

⁴⁴. On some of the problems involved, see Noel Annan, "Betrayal," New York Review of Books, September 24, 1987.

exception." ⁴⁵

Proposition 8.3: Both personal pride and the ambition to protect political reputations may inspire department head to act more independently than chief executives would prefer.

The demand for loyalty from these highly placed subordinates may not be matched by the idea that the chief executive will be similarly loyal to the department head. The chief executive-department head relationship is always threatened by the idea that the department head owes loyalty, but that the chief executive owes nothing. Moreover, once in office, the department head will discover new obligations to new subordinates, backlogs of unresolved litigation, or the dictates of the court upon "the agency." He or she will discover that the power pattern is Congress often produces demands a President would not wish to accept. Department heads will discover that they need to maintain their own rapport and effectiveness in the legislative process. It is not trivial, even in the British Parliament though the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister's

⁴⁵. Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 19??, 238.

agents, may control the House of Commons. There is always a need to keep down resentment and disaffection amongst the backbenchers.

More often, department heads will have some technical or jurisdictional basis on which they can indicate disagreement. They may feel obliged to do so. They may delay execution or evade compliance, seeking to determine if the chief executive may change his or her mind. Department heads thus force the chief executive to decide whether to withhold reinforcing a command, to overlook tacit noncompliance, or even to live with active opposition.

Department heads do not like to leave under fire. Hence, political chief executives would prefer to avoid the costs of controversial departures. The people called to head departments are very likely to have some prior standing of their own, whether as public figures of long standing. American Cabinet secretaries may have been national political figures, or active in some business or profession that gives them standing on their own amongst their peers. Hence, there will often be elaborate tacit, and ultimately explicit, bargaining to allow both parties to continue in the relationship as long as possible.

3. The Limits of Scale

Proposition 8.4: Chief executive incapacity to exert direct control is also a function of the number of departmental units to be controlled.

In most of the contemporary governments, the number of ministries or departments hovers somewhere around fifteen or twenty.⁴⁶ We could debate whether the functions are so natural as to produce some such number, or whether political experience and international communication leads to a rapid copying of similar forms in different countries. We could also note some distinct variations, such as that in the Soviet Union, which had seventy-seven ministries at the time of one recent data collection.⁴⁷

Should the seventy-seven Soviet ministries be compared more to

⁴⁶. Blondel, Jean. The Organization of Governments, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1982; and, the same author, World Leaders, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1980.

⁴⁷. See Blondel, The Organization of Governments. There are a variety of sources that identify the departments in each national state, though without discussing their functions. For such an identification list, I have found Lambert's World-Wide Government Directory. Washington: 1983 etc., very useful. For those scholars who are not inhibited by the public data of the Central Intelligence Agency, there is frequent reporting of the membership

bureaus in the United States than to the thirteen executive departments? The thirteen Cabinet departments do not exhaust the major executive agencies. Some other administrative agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, have everything the Cabinet departments have except the titular status.⁴⁸ Moreover, the departments and agencies have major sub-unit ("bureaus," customarily) with such autonomy that we take Arthur W. Macmahon and John D. Millett seriously when they write that the bureaus almost seemed the real departments.⁴⁹ Herbert Kaufman presents a nice summary of the views of a range of scholars on this point. Herefers to Leonard D. White, whose textbook dominated the public administration curriculum for some years prior to the behavioral revolution. White referred to a "tradition" of bureau autonomy. Marver H. Bernstein said that the relationship of the bureaus to the departments was similar to that of the departments to the White House, except that the

of governments in

⁴⁸. Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, United States Government Manual, (published annually), Washington: Government Printing Office.

⁴⁹. Macmahon, Arthur W. and Millett, John D., The Federal Administrators: a Biographical Approach to the Problem of Departmental Management, New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.

bureaus had still greater opportunity to assert their autonomy. The hypothesis of autonomy was recited by the Hoover Commission study (194?) and by the sage and perceptive Francis E. Rourke. Harold Seidman seemed to state his view even more strongly. Without the loyalty, or at least the neutrality, of the bureau chiefs, the Secretaries would be little more highly ornamental figureheads.

Kaufman quotes a bureau chief as saying that "We don't need the Department. We are perfectly able and willing to take care of ourselves." And Richard Neustadt is cited as referring to "virtually independent bureau chiefs [heading separated institutions sharing powers." Glen O. Robinson adopted a view somewhat akin to Macmahon and Millett, in that he attributes some part of autonomy to "specialized functions."⁵⁰

There did not seem much doubt, when the Soviet Union still functioned, that the General Secretary had far more control over the chain, to the Nth actor, than did the American President. However, such control could not have been perfect. It must have

⁵⁰. Kaufman, Herbert. Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs Washington: Brookings, 1981,

broken down at some point. How far does it did so was never clearly settled, although some literature indicated some failure⁵¹

Scale as a limit on decision by personal command is also indicated by the amount and variety of work efforts. Consider financial management, the most basic problem of efficient government. So much money is spent that close control, merely to prevent theft or misuse is extremely difficult.

The next task is to assure that money is not mistakenly spent for unintended purposes. And then there is the problem of assuring that the expenditure meets some efficiency test in the more economic sense of advantageous return.

It is also a big job to manage personnel. In any American executive department there must be as many as a dozen subordinates whose decisions would create either problems or opportunities for the chief executive, the entourage, or the department head. In some, there may be several. Intense compliance can be achieved with some policies, so that all (or

⁵¹. H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (ed.), Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971; and, Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Confiscated Power, New York: Harper & Row, 1982.

certainly most) program decisions will support of the chief executive's preferred policies. Similarly, enough pressure and motivation can be generated that all (or certainly most) operational detail decisions will be what the chief executive would desire. But the more energy is concentrated upon any matter, the more other matters must be left to other people who may lack insight, motivation, purpose, skill, or power to achieve the results the chief executive would desire. Therefore, command is necessarily diminished when the real span of control expands.

4. The Problem of Personal Psychology

Proposition 8.5: Acceptance of, rather than mere obedience to, command is a matter of the internal states of department heads.

"Acceptance" is more than mere obedience out of fear, though coercive possibilities may seldom be entirely out of mind. The acceptance of command sometimes means enthusiastic action to comply. The "psycho-dynamics" of power, as Peter Sperlich put it, may suggest that A accepts the direction of B because he or she identifies emotionally with B (referent power) or because he or she accepts intellectually the concept that B,

in the particular role, has the right to give direction (legitimate power).⁵²

The political psychology literature evidently reflects four images of leadership: "pied piper," salesman, puppet, and firefighter.⁵³ The pied piper image, identifies with those interested in "Great Man" and "trait" analyses, refers to the leader who ". . . sets the goals and directions for his followers and with promises charms them into following him."

(2) The leader as salesman, a focus of transactional and exchange analysis, has a role that "involves being sensitive to what people want and offering to help them get it.

Responsiveness to people's needs and desires is as important as being able to persuade people you can help them." (3) The

puppet image is that of the leader "given direction and strength by his followers, who pull the strings and make him move." This

she identifies with attributional analysis. (4) Finally, there is the firefighting image of the leader in which "leadership

⁵². Peter Sperlich, "Bargaining and Overload: An Essay on Presidential Power," in Aaron Wildavsky (ed.), The Presidency, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969, 168-192.

⁵³. Margaret G. Herman, "Ingredients of Political Leadership," in Hermann (ed.), Political Psychology: Contemporary Problems and Issues, New York: Jossey-Bass, 1986, 168.

occurs in response to what is happening in the environment."

None of the formulations summarized above provide much guidance to the transactions to be expected between and amongst chief executives, the executive entourage, and departmental executives or as to shift from bargaining to command and back again. Even the literature of military command, both practical and fictional, is about the problem of leadership, understood as the ability to get people to be willing to endure suffering on command. We have all heard or read of some commander whose men "would go through hell for him." Whether the extreme degree of assent implied in the military leadership can ever be found in government may be doubted. However, the general idea is the same.

There are at least three influences upon the acceptance of command: trust or confidence in the superior; the feeling of being trusted; and, the feeling that the superior is competent. Department heads' dispositions--their feelings--about doing what the chief executive wants them to do, may be expressed ultimately in the simple terms of satisfaction or disenchantment.

Proposition 8.6: The acceptance of command

is strongly influenced by the department
heads' trust or confidence in the purposes
and values of their superiors, and their
very clarity about those purposes and
values.

Department heads frequently--perhaps even commonly--do not know what the chief executive's purposes really are or how much trust they arise from the psychological sense of obligation that department heads sometimes have. Chief executives and people who rise to head departments may have never met before or they may have had long and close knowledge of each other. However, the offer of appointment and its acceptance create a new bond. It hints at some psychological pledge of loyalty. The chief executive has, by making such an appointment or choice, also made a public mortgage of reputation for judgment. Such a relationship would predispose people to trust the chief executive who has chosen them. This would not be true, of course, if they simply came from worlds in which being distrustful is a key element of their own operational codes, or if they had profound anxiety and discomfort with themselves.

But there are factors creating a cognitive uncertainty that

undermines acceptance. The department head inevitably misses many clues, and will be sensitive to the risk of missing clues. But there is also uncertainty that comes from having had to make essentially moral judgments about the superior. The virtual failure of acceptance is the picture that Aberbach and Rockman gave us of Richard Nixon fifteen years ago.⁵⁴ Henry Kissinger, whose opportunity to become a world figure was precisely the gift of Nixon, has sketched in detail the character that caused the failure.⁵⁵

Cabinet officers, in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations came to office with a vast amount of uncertainty, or even simple ignorance about where they stood, in relation to the Government generally and to the President specifically. Their own words reveal this. About half of the Kennedy appointees, one in five of the Eisenhower appointees, and one in four of the Johnson appointees used language indicating that they perceived serving the President as a major role. That is what they thought the country, society, or some entity outside themselves expected them to do.

⁵⁴. Aberbach, Joel and Rockman, Bert

⁵⁵. Kissinger, Henry A.

"Goals" are the specific things that Cabinet officers have in mind for themselves. If the roles are somewhat fuzzy, we might expect goals to be a little clearer. They were a little clearer, at least in the Kennedy Administration. The secretaries serving under President Kennedy identified working on the priorities determined by Kennedy as a primary goal far more than did the secretaries serving under Eisenhower or Johnson. The goals of the Johnson cabinet were quite disparate, with no one goal predominating. Half of the Eisenhower Cabinet members identified specifically policy-making goals.

What should we make of this? Was there a deeper acceptance of command or was there simply a knowledge that obedience to command was the order of the day and that, accordingly, one had to sound enthusiastic?

Proposition 8.7: The acceptance of command is also closely related to the feeling of being trusted by the superior.

The feeling of being trusted is undermined by experience that leads to feelings of having been betrayed or deceived. Some part of American Presidents' earning acceptance is

accessibility to department heads as principal subordinates. For virtually all department heads, access to the chief is a sign of status, first step in satisfaction. That is one reason American Cabinet officers talk a lot about "serving the President." Such talk gives them a claim for greater access to the President. If they can make this claim stick, they have opportunity both to run their own subjective tests on the President and to assess what tests are being run on themselves.

Proposition 8.8: The acceptance of command is enhanced by the feeling that the superior is competent, "knows what he (she) is doing." The absence of such a feeling leads to a kind of disabling disappointment.

5. The Department Head Against the Entourage

Proposition 8.9: The department heads' acceptance of command tends to be impeded by the role and power of the entourage since:

(a) the work of the entourage communicates that the department

head is distrusted;

(b) the personalized competition

for power within the entourage

elicits distrust from the

department heads; and

(c) the hit-or-miss interventions

of the entourage in substantive

matters will often lead the

department heads', closer to the

substance, to be distrustful of

the competence of the chief

executive and those who advise him

or her personally.

This set of propositions predicts that, in some respects, the entourage--which chief executives find it necessary to have--is also counterproductive.

Proposition 8.10: Most department heads,

most of the time, will be defeated in

encounters where the entourage is determined

to achieve some other result.

Marver Bernstein twenty years ago wrote that the impact of

presidential staffs upon departmental staffs is likely to be only as great as the secretary and under secretary permit.

"Personal force," "competence," and "institutional facilities at their command" will yield the leverage that agency executives can exercise.⁵⁶ Presumably, "personal force" means assertiveness, ego-centricity. Competence is harder to define, for it could mean professional knowledge of the jurisdictional subject matter, capability to persuade the Congress, the ability to keep the media friendly or many other things. If public reporting is accepted, we might explain the defeats of Secretary Rogers by Kissinger or of Secretary Vance by Brzezinski. Haig also was unable to prevent an erosion of his political power, though I am not aware of any observer who describes him as lacking in "personal force." If personal force is held in abeyance, then competence may be pertinent. Nor can we show easily an objective standard under which Haig was less "competent" than other Secretaries of State. Nor can we identify, easily, the difference in "institutional facilities."

The factors that make a difference are skill in maintaining

⁵⁶. Ibid.

support and cooperative responses within the entourage--which assuredly is what the public reports suggest that Haig did not achieve. If the entourage is the point from which an intervention may be expected, then it is the point at which agency personnel may seek to estop intervention. That is tantamount to the hypothesis that the Secretary can limit the entourage if he (or she) can persuade the entourage to accept self-restraint.

The intellectually promising part of the Bernstein hypothesis concerns the Secretary's power as a function of the ability to surmount the restrictive standard operating procedures. Department heads sometimes override standard operating procedures, or convert them into their own tools, by mobilizing power and forming alliances with others within the executive system, by control of substantive and procedural knowledge, or sometimes by successful appeal to the chief executive to disown the entourage's efforts. The chief executive may disown those efforts if he or she is persuaded of the correctness of the department's position, the rectitude or superiority of the department head in question, or of the

political costs in failure to disown the entourage's effort. Within the executive world, this appeal to disown is the last step, too dangerous to be taken except under extreme circumstances. Finally, department heads may seek to maintain control over the relevant decisions, even without the agreement of the chief executive, because of support elsewhere in the body politic. (In American terms, this means mainly support in Congress or in the relevant interest groups.) "Constituency" is one of the crucial reasons that many a department head, with no intent to defy the chief executive, may find himself or herself in a position where much resistance or evasion is imperative. If a group has established itself as a relevant constituency, it holds sort of a mortgage upon the resources of the organization.

Department Heads and Their Departments

Departmental decisions and actions may run a very wide range from large policy actions to the minutest administrative detail. Within some jurisdictional basis, departmental decisions and actions may impose some command or rule (regulatory), assist some person or group to carry out an action (facilitative), or carry out some investment (entrepreneurial).

Rules setting out the kind of fuel a power company may use are an exercise of the regulatory function. So are restrictions and directions on workplace conditions. The agricultural research programs of the Department of Agriculture or various business development services are all facilitative. In the immediate sense, highway building has a strong entrepreneurial side in that the most important thing may be the correct management of the investment being made, and this is more or less true of defense purchasing as well.

Problems of work and policy involve the coordination of the lower levels of the external political recruits (secretaries, ministers, deputy secretaries, etc.), the higher levels of the career civil service, and ultimately the employees who have no policy or professional, but "just _____ work there."⁵⁷

As chief executives have entourages, with which department heads contend, so department heads have their own entourages, with which their own subordinates and the rest of the world must

⁵⁷. The International Union of Operating Engineers, which represents the janitors in the New York City public schools, is an excellent illustration of the employee interest not much related to the policy or program interests. According to the New York Times, the success of this organization is manifest in the fact that the janitors in many schools are paid more than the principals and they are accounted amongst the powerful interests in the school system. August ___?? 1987. The date is between August 1 and 15.

contend. In the United States Government, those presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation are usually entitled to appoint certain persons in turn.⁵⁸ British ministers, on the other hand, have Private Offices staffed from the Civil Service.⁵⁹ The regulation of access is, inevitably, a necessary function for the department head's version of the entourage.

Proposition 8.11: The values likely to be found in the civil service will be those of the group that has longest dominated the political process, to the extent of being able to establish its preferences as part of a broad consensus. A civil service without values is nonexistent, although a civil service capable of sublimating its own substantive values can be found.

This fact is likely to give special importance to the

⁵⁸. Normally, these persons will hold "Schedule C" status, a "schedule" being merely a category of personnel within the Civil Service classification system. There is no reason why career civil servants cannot be appointed, if the officeholder desires. But there is generally no barrier to the appointment of any other person, within or without the Government. Schedule C is one of the remaining categories of legitimate patronage. for officials who had policy-determining roles, was a result of this consideration.

⁵⁹. Henderson, Nicholas. The Private Office: A Personal View of Five Foreign Secretaries and of Government from the Inside, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984.

entourage's more personal side when changes of political leadership occur. The ultimate effect of the entourage, when its tendency to bad side effects can be limited, is to allow the department head to cope with the disjunction of the formal and the real organization.

Proposition 8.12: Department heads, recognizing their inability to act directly upon everything, enter de facto or tacit bargains with their own entourages.

People are always changing some of their relationships, trying to make some more prominent, others more obscure, and to terminate some others altogether. Nearly any American department (or administrative agency of any importance) will have at least five layers or levels of decision-making authority. There is a similar set of authority layers in other governmental systems, as in the United Kingdom which is roughly sketched in this section. (See Figure 1, following, and in text below.) At the topmost management level, in the United States, there is the Secretary or counterpart official, whose titular second in command, is sometimes designated "Deputy Secretary." The Deputy secretary position has evolved, over the past fifty

years or so, as a variation on the assistant secretary function which was the original second in command position.

There may be confusion about the language because an Under Secretary may be the No. 2 official in some agencies, and in those agencies is the functional equivalent of the Deputy Secretary. The Assistant Secretary is now at the third level. The American fourth level is the Deputy Assistant Secretary, a political appointee under Schedule C.

The political head of the British department is the minister, in the more prestigious departments sometimes called a "secretary of state." (See Figure 1) The British department heads' immediate political subordinates usually are ministers of state, though the titles may vary and there are some other political ministers who are very important. For decision-making purposes, the American political appointees must be in daily contact with "the permanent government". The term refers mainly to the bureau chiefs whose reported average service was about 8.5 years over the period (1933-48), and of the civil servants who are immediately beneath them.⁶⁰ The career civil servants are those who have responsibility up to the program and bureau

level. They may be even more important, in fact, than Assistant Secretaries or even some Deputy Secretaries.

Figure 1
Approximate Comparison of American and British Ranks

<u>American Format</u>	<u>British Format</u>	
<u>Political</u>	<u>Political</u>	
<u>Civil Service</u> Secretary	Secretary of State/ Minister	
Permanent Secretary		
Deputy Secretary	No equivalent (?)	
Assistant Secretary Secretary	Minister of State	Deputy
(Schedule and other exempted) Secretary	Parliamentary Private	Under
Deputy Asst. Secretary (administrative)	Secretary (junior MP; no ad- ministrative supervision)	
Career Civil Service Supergrades/SES, etc.		Assistant Bureau Chiefs

⁶⁰. Bernstein, op. cit.,

and
Secretaries

below

Principals

The American assistant secretaries' positions are paradoxical. They are important and trivial, strong and rather weak. The assistant secretaries may sometimes play an important role in the mechanisms of departmental decision-making.⁶¹ For the moment, let us talk as if the only assistant secretaries of interest were those with major "line" responsibilities. To make matters simple, assume a new Administration in the United States. If such an administration sets a policy direction, then line officials, including politically chosen assistant secretaries, have to prepare the special messages to Congress. In order to do that, they must also entertain calculations of finance, staff, policy considerations, and political feasibility, and must undertake public relations, legislative

⁶¹. I wish expressly and conspicuously to acknowledge Thomas Murphy, Don Nuechterlein, and Ron Stupak (eds.), ???? The Bureaucracy: The View From The Assistant Secretary's Desk, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978, from which I have taken extensively in developing the portion that relates to assistant secretaries. The volume itself is the product of a conference for assistant secretaries at the Federal Executive Institute (FEI), Charlottesville, Virginia, in 1977. Some twenty then-current and former assistant secretaries were gathered to discuss a variety of issues.

liaison, and detailed negotiations with both during the authorization stage and during appropriations. The negotiations may include as parties the Office of Management and Budget, the people responsible for legislative relations, and the external constituencies. If, as we know, the distance between the secretaries and the White House is substantial, we should expect it to be much more so for the usual assistant secretary. It is simply a political reality. The other reality, however, is that those who have to accept this without struggle are likely to become politically isolated. Imagine, for instance, that the Secretary has poor lines to the White House Office, but that one has oneself a close associate at the second level of the White House Office. Will one really decline to do what one can to create favorable relationships for one's own programs, the programs in which failure will be held to one's own account at least as much as that of the Secretary?

The hypothetical indicates why many other assistant secretaries display high sensitivity to the entourage. They seek to "stay in tune with current thinking on administration policy. . . . spot [and, if possible know] those . . . who have

a personal impact on [the President, . . . speak for the President's] larger plans;. . . act as "filters" [and, if they wish] can transmit ideas, plans, and programs to the President."

The principal functions of the junior ministers appear to be in public relations and extra-departmental political representation. Pressure upon backbenchers is a means by which British interests communicate their demands to the Government. According to Lawson and Bruce-Gardyne, some lobbies "cultivate politicians to the point, if need⁶² be, of inciting backbench rebellion. . . ." However, they say that it is more common to work with the MPs as a last resort, "to be appealed to only when the possibilities of negotiation with the civil servants has been exhausted." Junior ministers keep in touch, so as to assist in keeping back bench pressure at a tolerable level. There are some proposals that would, if implemented, make the junior ministers rather more like American assistant secretaries, although even those who favor such proposals ⁶³

⁶². Bruce-Gardyne, Jock and Lawson, Nigel. The Power Game: An Examination of Decision-Making in Governments, Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1976, 178.

⁶³. Theakston, Kevin. "The Use and Abuse of Junior Ministers," The Political Quarterly 51: 1 (January-March 1986), 18-35.

recognize that they are politically unlikely.

Parliamentary private secretaries are not quite comparable to anything in the United States, though some of their work might be related to what Americans would call legislative liaison. They are members of Parliament and, if successful, will ascend the ladder to become junior ministers sooner or later.

American departments contain bureaus and bureaus contain programs. The agency--the bureau, most often--is the career protective envelope. If the department head delegates from sheer necessity, so must the bureau chief also delegate a great deal. American civil servants--with the exception of the Foreign Service--are mainly recruited from accounting, biology, chemistry, engineering, or other fields of specific training and education. The key elements in the system are the demonstration of competence on some formal basis, and--at the same time--the development of networks of sponsoring allies who will be of assistance as time passes. Civil service "professionals" learn professional standards by which to judge their work and worth! They are indoctrinated in the belief that being "a professional"

is nearly the highest moral value. Over a period of years, the civil servant goes through a process of being fit to positions that are rated on the basis of the formal examinations, of being subject to referrals and promotions within the structure of the system.

The British civil service is a corps of professionals whose careers involve a great deal of movement from one department to another. The professional civil service head of the department is the Permanent Secretary, a position of great power substantially parallel to the minister. The Permanent Secretary is not necessarily in the department a very long time. (The Foreign Office apart, long saturation in a single ministry is avoided. The value is placed on the generalist administrator and, as a general rule, a career is likely to be damaged by extended service in a single department.) The mean tenure of a Permanent Secretary appears to be about six years, more or less, which is not notably different from some the career civil service bureau chiefs in the United States.⁶⁴ The Permanent Secretary is

⁶⁴. This is a rough estimate that I make from inspection of the lists of permanent secretaries ("Heads of Departments and Public Offices") in David Butler and Gareth Butler (eds.), British

"permanent" rather than "temporary." His or her tenure is independent of whether it fits the preference of the minister. If a minister wishes to replace a Permanent Secretary, he or she must convince the Prime Minister. There is a natural conflict of interest between Prime Ministers and other ministers, in which permanent secretaries are the unstated allies of Prime Ministers. Therefore, such approval by Prime Ministers will be given most reluctantly.

The minister on his or her own, without the support of the Permanent Secretary, is actually a politically weak character. In that regard, the minister may not be notably different from the American Secretary who is opposed by a strong bureau chief. Beneath the permanent secretaries are their "deputy secretaries," and beneath them the "undersecretaries" whose divisions might be somewhat equivalent to bureaus in American government. The daily work at a level of professional detail is the responsibility of the assistant secretaries who supervise an array of principals.

Layers of authority penetrate each other. If you are "the boss," somebody will be doing something that you would not

authorize if you could know about it beforehand.⁶⁵ That person often knows that you would not authorize it. Others know it. But frequently, you do not know it until too late. But it is not only that there are people below whom you cannot control, because of the lack of knowledge. There will even be people below you who have some control over you. Some of the authority may be incorporated formally into the organization. The delicate problem of the subordinate employee whose real function includes informing superiors of what one is doing, or the subordinate employee whose social relationships put him or her into normal off-hours contact with the superior to whom one has only the most formal contact.

Some authority is at a lower level when the senior official has to have the professional sanction of the subordinate that something is the "right" thing to do. The power to withhold or certify "right" is the unique power of the professionals, such as auditors or lawyers. It is slightly ambiguous, but not trivial, in regard to the military. Every few years, some senior military officer asserts that he "accepts" authority but

⁶⁵. Smith, Lt. Gen. Perry M. Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders, Washington: National Defense University Press, 1986.

that his "professional military judgment" is that everything the authority holder wishes to do is disastrous. What the officer is usually offering is a straightforward judgment about some issue of foreign policy. That is what happens when work rules have been set by agreement with a union. In some cases, what such people do has no necessary relationship to the overt organizational mission. But their activities may produce variations in authority when internal cultural habits and work relationships are either unknown to the more senior official or impose greater control on some subordinates.

The layering of authority, and the disjuncture of formal (prescribed) and real organization, is maintained, in part at least, by permanent conflicts in the personnel rules.

Proposition 9. Department heads' ability to command, or necessity to bargain, will be influenced by three competing or conflicting rationalities in the selection of official subordinates: managerial rationality, representational rationality, and control rationality.

According to the advocates of managerial rationality, there

is a "best" process of government, and it includes the idea that department heads should have complete managerial authority and responsibility. Allison and Szanton are among the most explicit in saying that "we believe it imperative that the President-elect permit his Cabinet to select a team of their own subordinates."⁶⁶ Indeed Allison and Szanton also said that "(t)he refusal of Secretaries-designate to accept deputies or assistants imposed by the White House may be a good test of their own qualifications."⁶⁷ From the chief executive's viewpoint, appointments are also a form of representational rationality, of ticket-balancing, and thus of social legitimization for the government in office. There can be much rationality in a department head's decision, explicit or tacit, to accede to what the chief executive sees as necessities. There was a rationality to the symbolism of appointing women and Blacks, for instance, so that this was the one aspect on which Secretary Califano reports that he personally felt pressure from

⁶⁶. Allison, Graham and Szanton, Peter. Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection, New York: Basic Books, 1976, 86.

⁶⁷. Allison and Szanton,

the President.⁶⁸ It was important, for the symbolism of his Administration and the good will and morale of some of those who supported him, that people who would more likely have been omitted before were appointed to a variety of positions.

Finally, from the chief executive's viewpoint, subordinate appointments are a means to keep better informed of activities within the departments. This is control rationality. It can easily turn ugly. It undermines the feeling of trust, and of being trusted, that are necessary to the willing acceptance of command. Yet it is a means often deemed necessary.

Control rationality is not only a good clue to temporary political appointments. It is also a good clue to the role of the professionals in government, the professionals in government who may be more closely aligned to some power center other than the political superior to whom they are formally responsible. Subordinates may have been placed in positions that are beyond the department heads' control, or may even have been placed in such a position for the purpose of reporting to other parties.

The implication that anyone who does not pick his or her

⁶⁸. Califano, 37.

own subordinates is an unworthy weakling is not shared by all, if action be taken as the evidence. There is substantial evidence that even tough and well-regarded combatants sometimes lose on such matters.⁶⁹ From their willingness to lose, we must infer that managerial rationality is not all there is. Potential department heads often apply the same principle that Gerald Kaufman advised. "Take what you are offered." This may mean taking an office that was not particularly wanted. It may mean taking an office that is particularly wanted, even though one knows that some of one's own subordinates are not one's own free choices. A department head may rationally choose to stop short of insisting upon such total freedom if it might lead to other results--including conflict with the chief executive or even exclusion altogether. The person in question might compromise because he or she lacks "strength of character" or "personal courage." He or she might do so because of vainglorious desire to hold office. However, he or she might also do so from a sense of duty, or from the belief that the office is one from which something important could be done.

⁶⁹. Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980, 34-35.

Multiple rationality criteria means that department heads and their principal subordinates will frequently have conflicting motives and interests. Accordingly, the layers of authority will never fit comfortably--new occasions in which a department head must choose to command or to accept bargaining will arise. These occasions must, sooner or later, come about in a focus on the substance of what the department does. The new department head will find people pressing on three things inevitably: what to do or avoid (policy or substance), and when to do it. The department head, even in a political system that does not admit constitutionalism, must ask if there is infringement by some other department head or infringement on some other department head. Jurisdiction is central.⁷⁰ Associated necessarily with jurisdiction, is the substance of what is to be considered.

The discussion of British reorganization ("machinery of government" changes above,) illustrates how important the issue of jurisdiction may be in affecting the relationship

⁷⁰. I have earlier set out a brief schema for studying jurisdictional relationships (expansion, stabilization, and retrenchment) from the level of agency decision-making, i.e. department or bureau decision-making. Matthew Holden, Jr. "'Imperialism' in Bureaucracy," American Political Science Review 60: 4 (December 1966),943-951.

between the chief executive and departmental ministers. But the matter is more significant for its general reach. Government reorganization may be understood as a means of achieving optimal performance in the objective delivery of public services. Sometimes that is the purpose, and the effect. But many a Washington bureaucrat is more likely to understand reorganization as a power play.

At this time, I am concerned only with jurisdictional issues as they set the boundaries for bargaining or command between higher and lower executive decision-makers, above all chief executives and their department heads. However, as we seek fundamental features of political action that are observable, and are repetitive in many circumstances, times, and cultures, jurisdiction appears to be a promising focus of inquiry for other reasons, as well. The allocation, alteration, and removal of official jurisdiction occurs everywhere, and these actions have the benefit that they are relatively easily perceived from the outside-- even though some-
-crucial data regarding them may be held secure by decision-makers. Moreover, they occur on such a large scale as to lend themselves to substantial quantitative analysis.

The department head must have--or quickly get--some idea of the legitimate range of answers, or of the subordinates who can offer the legitimate range. He or she must deal with the question of "in what order?" if there are more things to consider than can be considered at the time. He or she must have some cognizance of what things are ready to be decided, what are land mines about to explode, and what will yield no good result at all.

The department head has to deal with a few subordinates, or with a larger number, depending on time and circumstance. The department head must issue directions and resolve conflicts among those subordinates, or it may be that those subordinates will take their conflicts elsewhere, or may even resolve them themselves. What precipitates conflicts? The substance of what is to be, or the policy and its contingent program and operational details, will precipitate conflict. The dispute may be quite open, or it may be veiled in arguments about the interpretations of rules (or of a recent study, or even of the need or design for a study). This may involve a pretense is that nothing is changing, or that everything is changing very rapidly. Seldom is it true that no one is trying to change

anything, if that is the assertion or that people are trying very hard to change, if that is the assertion. The cooperation of the career bureaucrats is not always available, but it can be crucial. Eliciting such cooperation also requires political appointees to understand when and how there is some natural tension within the ranks of the departmental professionals. The politically-chosen leadership has some responsibility to understand what the tension comes from and what its implications are. Ask why civil servants may be willing to support a policy quickly, or why they may resist or evade and part of the answer comes with their judgment about its content. The career officials make their own judgments about substance.

Governmental professionals, both civil service and in the armed forces, learn how to take account of the judgments of their "ignorant" political superiors. Sometimes, their superiors are ignorant and have no intention of learning. But often the word means a serious disagreement with the view that the political superior will hold, which is the proper way to describe the career Foreign Service Officers' attitudes toward the Reagan Administration. People who produce analytical material or professional recommendations simply cannot live, indefinitely,

with the rejection of their preferred options at all levels. There is an implied deal between subordinates and superiors that the subordinates will be taken seriously. Thus, there is some powerful organizational demand upon the superiors to recognize the "competence" and "professionalism" of the subordinates, which is the same as saying that they must not be overruled on everything. The reciprocal is that the subordinates will not give advice polluted by prejudice or withhold information that should be given. They are not happy if their political superiors reject their judgments. Nor are they easily disposed to accept technical contradictions from other professionals. The strongest illustration is in controversies between scientists about policies grounded on scientific judgments may be virtually religious in their intensity. Ultimate values have something to do with compliance and resistance. People may also be motivated, influenced, encouraged or the self-esteem they value more than they value the approval of the chief executive or the department head. In America, the most influential perceptions - -or surely those people will most easily admit--are the values approved in a secular and educated culture as "professionalism."

The "politics" thus inserted cannot be ignored. It has to

be tolerated in the interest of realism. Sometimes professional governmental servants--civil or military--practice such politics brilliantly. But secretly they find it morally objectionable, demeaning to themselves and their concept of the public interest or, as the military are more likely to conceive it, what patriotism truly would require. The intrusion of such "politics" is deemed fundamentally objectionable and soiling.

If one would ask how and why civil servants or military officers cooperate easily, or with reluctance, of course one has also to look to personal exposure and penalties. People will not easily obey orders that put them at high risk. All officials--at whatever level--are responsible, individually, for the legality of their actions. All are subject, in principle, to criminal sanctions. There may also be civil (monetary) liability for actions committed ultra vires. No one wants to go to jail or pay out scarce personal funds. If secular values may provide guidance, so also do religious values. Whenever religious belief is so strong that officials genuinely fear for their souls, the chief executive will have a hard time getting officials to obey orders. Religiosity, or in the supernatural in some form, surely has not disappeared in a good many

countries in Asia and Africa, and possibly even some in Latin America.

Intense religious expression is unlikely in American politics, and even less so in most advanced industrial nations. However, it would be imprudent to say that it has no relevance. The rumor that James Watt conducted prayer meetings in his office at the Federal Power Commission was taken seriously, even if produced chortles amongst the secularized. We may reasonably guess that there are some other people who share the same values. What may be more to the point is that they may not have open opportunities to exercise their religious values within the scope of their officially defined jobs. However, even this is not so certain. Is efficient administration of a free abortion program not related to the religious convictions of a devout religious advocate of the anti-abortion position?

Organizational demand includes the competing demands from within the organization, spawned by values and interests that subordinates recognize and value--whether the department head does or not. It is not that decisions cannot be made without internal assent. They can. It is not that they cannot be made without such expert knowledge as the organization may contain.

Decisions can be made and implemented with the greatest ignorance. Sometimes however there are professional self-images that mandate attempting to participate responsibly and professionally. Subordinates may also wish to get back in the game, so that participation within the context of an uninformed decision, and of trying to bring some information to bear on its implementation becomes important.

If the department head is unable to command the assent of subordinates, at the right time, many of the decisions that he or she pronounces in the name of the organization will be ineffectual. The withholding of assent from within will sooner or later lead to the frustration of important external demand, and a reaction therefrom.

External demand is the physical expression of constituency interest, when the constituency speaks for itself. Instead, the real base of survival is in the constituency of the department. The critical task, of those who are responsible for departmental leadership, is to maximize favorable constituencies that can, and will, render aid and guidance on behalf of those things that the administrative politician favors. External demand often sustains bureau autonomy, or the autonomy of the

professional civil service, from the department head. It has to be structured in accord with other realities to fit the particular governmental system. In the United States, the appointment process, with the fact of Senate participation, interests can enter through persuading some senator with a claim to advocate their position. This is sufficiently well established that many Presidential appointments are effectively committed to the veto, not the affirmative interest of such groups. The fact that both houses must participate in appropriations and legislation provides a further means for the expression of external demand. Congressional oversight in the American case means that those who can influence the particular committees and subcommittees are likely to have a special influence in the agency as well. External demand can generate decision-making that may persist once the demand has been perceived, and even after the initiators have lost interest. If a group has established itself as a relevant constituency, it holds sort of mortgage upon the resources of the organization. The decisions about legislation, and about organizational structure, reflecting effective constituency demand until a given moment give a particular set of necessities to department

heads. If, as sometimes happens, the constituency's interests and values are absorbed by agency personnel, they become part of the agency culture. They are no longer external demand merely.

Department-level decisions also require judgments about when something is to be done, and in what order compared to other things that also are to be done. Department heads must sometimes choose between competing subordinates and their projects, or even overrule all subordinates, regarding some decision about the sequence.

There is a natural sequence in the flow of decisions in human groups. For purposes of departmental decision-making, the biggest ideas will usually have been settled. But there will be a good deal of room for deliberation and pronouncement of particular policies within the context of such ideas. This is where the most apparent controversy takes place. If some decision is reached, it still requires some degree of ritual validation. We are then at the point of implementation, about which so much controversy often appears to emerge.

In the sequencing of decisions, the preparation of options is crucial, and involves a good deal of judgment about timing

and a good deal of reliance on asserted (and assorted) technical arguments.

Timing is a vital part of this process. In the United States Government, the departmental legislative program must involve a great many such issues. Which of N bills, from counterpart units, makes the best sense to send to Congress? Which problem is inherently more important? Which is closer to a crisis condition? Such matters must be answered, but they need not be coterminous with the answer you will get if you ask: (a) which committee chairman is more friendly? (b) which committee chairman can cause the most harm and will? (c) which committee chairman has done the most for us when we needed it? (d) which bill will distribute the most benefits in the largest number of districts? (e) which bill will cause the most financial loss in the largest number of districts? (f) which will get bad editorials in the New York Times and the Washington Post.

There are comparable problems and issues that arise if the question is, instead, new rules that might be issued, having the force of law, under existing statutes. What if the action involves the revocation of old privileges that some influential

group has been enjoying for a long time? Similarly, there might be major new administrative practices, or even more dramatic and fundamental, new budgetary proposals. At the same time, there could be contemplated assignments or reassignments of persons. This might be controversial because of the numbers involved, or because the particular individuals have either very strong support or a lot of adversity around them. The timing of proposals is important, and the ability of a superior official to know when a proposal is truly active is also important. One of the factors that is of significance, accordingly, is that issues may be debated until the range is somewhat narrowed, and the matter is placed before the superior official only when the range has been narrowed. The department head must, perforce, leave a good deal to political subordinates about what is ready for decision. But crises in the physical environment or the economy can easily precipitate changes for which no one was prepared. Similarly, political crises in the Congress may precipitate unexpected demands on the department head. Significant changes from the Federal courts, that lay burdens upon the agency, may generate some need for the department head to take cognizance of something that would

otherwise have been attended to only at a lower level. (My presumption is that there are some rough analogies in other countries in measures of external demand that may be institutionally expressed. They might even be institutionally disruptive, as would riots on a large scale or an unexpected movement of the tank corps down the main street.)

The second-level and even third-level American political official has a more intensive analytical role than seems to be the case for British junior ministers. The analytical work, as far as I can ascertain, in the British case would be managed lightly by a Deputy Secretary, and through the Deputy Secretary by an Under Secretary in some greater detail. The most intense work would be done by the Assistant Secretaries and their Principals.

The importance of the analytical work done within departments links to organizational demand. Probably, nowhere in American government has the analytical role been more important to policy than in defense politics since World War II.⁷¹ It is also probable that nowhere has the choice of

⁷¹. Hitch, Charles J. Decision-Making for Defense, Berkeley: University of California Press, 19??; and, E. S. Quade (ed., Analysis for Military Decisions, New York: Rand McNally, 1964.

analytical tools been more finely honed to the results that, ab initio, they were desired to produce. Substance is one of the factors that gives some point to the endless discussions of short tenure at the level of the department head. Department heads may leave too rapidly, given the time it may take to understand a situation, frame an approach, secure its adoption, and do something about its implementation, at least to some modest degree. The important issue is that the extent to which a superior official can enter the analytical process may determine his or her ability to uncover not only the options put up for action at the moment, but the real bases for those options and the options that have been considered and set aside. This engagement with the analytical details, and with developing an understanding of the alternative approaches at an analytical level can be fairly intensive in American government. Analytical failure can produce political damage. If the agency professionals do not comprehend what analytical issues are likely to be raised elsewhere, the agency can be embarrassed to a serious degree. Some part of timing is knowing where the bodies are buried, which is why short tenure may be important.

There can be very few American adults who have not heard

that old-time bureaucrats sit in Washington and say, "I have seen Secretaries come, and I have seen Secretaries go. . . ." This may not be said as often as folklore would have it. But it is said some times, and it is not limited to the United States.

Cooperation, Coexistence, Active Fighting, and Dominance

Departmental decision-making, when the department head is seen as its center, may take any one of four patterns: cooperation, coexistence, combat (or active fighting) between the department head and major subordinates, or control (or dominance). The department head's relationships to subordinates grow out of the amorphous, uncertain, compelling relations of personal psychology, the scale of government (which means delegation as a matter of conservation of human energy), and the existence of compulsive power.

I have argued that the personal relationship is strongly influenced by the feeling of trust, of being trusted, and of the competence of the superior. There may be a high degree of interest and enthusiasm because subordinates enjoy what they are doing and enjoy the working styles of their departmental superiors. Cooperation may arise out of a strong identification of members of the executive team with each other, or with each

other's styles of work and approach. It is not an idealistic or unexpected possibility. But the question of what proportion of the cases should be encompassed is rather difficult. The high level of cooperation and enthusiasm is difficult to achieve and to sustain.

Coexistence is another form of relationship amongst top level departmental officials. Coexistence is one means of avoiding some of the worst conflict. It may be that the social resources are such that full control would not be possible, even if the chief executive and the department head agreed on it. We should probably believe that coexistence among high level officials comes when the department head cannot have full control, primarily because the political needs of the chief executive will not permit that full control.

Active fighting, induced by differences of personality, outlook or political alliance, or responsibility is also something we can see. It appears from time to time, either because a chief executive finds it too expensive politically to settle the matter or because the chief executive finds that it serves his or her control purposes to allow it to go on. Active fighting may also be resolved by overt agreements or avoided by

concessions.

There are, of course, some Cabinet officers who bring very clear conceptions of influence and control. Dominance pays the department head if he or she can attain it. If department heads want freedom from intervention from above, they must show that they can assert command below. If the department head is thought to be able to control the department, then the chief executive is more likely to allow such latitude. And if that happens, the entourage has little excuse to intervene. The assertion of command might depend upon simple compulsive power. The compulsive abilities of department heads are relatively modest, as a general proposition.

Dominance, despite the complex situation, is sometimes achieved and sustained for a while. It is the form of relationship deemed most praiseworthy in the culture, and generally in the literature of administration. If the achievement of dominance is defined as ministerial success, what are some of the requirements for dominance? No one knows how Secretarial dominance is achieved. However, some requirements may be hypothesized.

Clarity of purpose and concord with the chief executive

seems so obvious as not to require saying. It does need to be stated explicitly because there are such natural pressures to the contrary. The condition is obvious only in the sense that it is obvious that if one wants to be comfortable, one should not get exposed to hot weather in Alabama in the summer time. The question is: can it be avoided? Possibly yes, sometimes. But there are some considerations that make it extremely doubtful. The scale of governmental operations may require department heads to do things that the chief executive or his entourage will sneeringly call "going native." It may also be that the natural distance between the chief executive, and the entourage, and most department heads will simply forbid a good enough of understanding in time for the right actions.

The next condition, above support of the chief executive, is that indecipherable known as "will." This implies clarity, purposes and specificity of objectives, and an ability to learn how resources fit the situation.

Skills of inquiry and substantial grasp of technical issues are among the more important means for assertion of control. It is, indeed, impossible not to find significant areas of an agency's functioning in which the politically responsible person

will be ill-informed. It is, however, critical for the new appointee, in particular, to ask questions that strike the quick on matters that he is specifically expected not to understand, to exploit ignorance by requiring explanations that are clear and logical, thus bringing to the surface either ignorance or deception on the part of the briefer; and to develop enough knowledge of at least one important topic to be regarded as at least as competent on that subject as any of the professionals in the agency. The cabinet officer without subject matter competence, or without an unusual capacity to get critical issues developed despite his or her ignorance, will be the Rodney Dangerfield of government.

In order to establish respect for himself/herself, the Secretary has to establish a series of things. He/she has to establish that he/she cannot be fooled, for instance, but too much concern with not being fooled leads to the judgment that he/she is paranoid and the damning comment that "he/she does not trust his staff" (which frequently he/she should not). Therefore, he/she needs to trust the staff, but, on the other hand, to be "too trusting" he/she becomes an "automatic

signature" for whatever his/her staff proposes.⁷²

Developing external sources of professional information is another means of enhancing Secretarial dominance. External intelligence allows the cabinet officer to be well informed without being prisoner to the professionals in his or her agency, no matter how high-minded or well-informed these professionals may be. Inter-agency politics is a crucial and never-ending aspect of public administration. Some of the department head's ability to exert control over his or her subordinates depends on the ability to create and maintain a stable environment, proof against the attacks of others. But this also calls for a good deal of knowledge about the internal problems of the agency. It means, among other things, that the department head should have the ability to see risks and opportunities that his or her subordinates will not see. This leads to the external relations problem. One of the implications for a department head is the ease with which the department head can be "blind sided" by technical criticism coming from another agency. It is not true that agencies will always seek to expand, but they will have to be concerned about

⁷² Mann, Dean E. The Assistant Secretaries, Washington: Brookings Institution, 19__206(?)

their boundary relationships with others.⁷³ The problem of the agency head, as Sayre and Kaufman pointed out, is to find means of stabilizing the relations with other agencies if possible.⁷⁴ Another means of control is based upon developing a good appreciation of the political networks amongst the subordinates, as well as between the subordinates, constituency groups, the Congress. But this is far easier to assert as a goal than to perform in practice.

Finally, the constituency structure of the departments and agencies is crucial. Chief executives, whether Presidents or others, seldom render sustained political support to Cabinet officers who are under fire for policy reasons. Nor can they afford to do so often and long. Hence, department heads must make some judgment of their own as to whose favorable attention they and their agencies need, and whose they would rather not have. If groups have the capability to put their claims on the mind of the chief executive, then department heads must cope with those groups. If those groups have no adversaries, or if their adversaries are impotent, then their interests will be

⁷³. Holden, "'Imperialism' in Bureaucracy,"

⁷⁴. Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City, New York: Russell

installed in departmental purposes. The groups' desires will be what the department will be instructed to pursue. Under that circumstance, departmental decision-making is soon likely to turn into a command system of pure administration.

Summary of Propositions

Proposition 1. Reality is not bargaining or command, but a permanent tension between them. If we imagine the line 0-1 to represent a see-saw, with A as the fulcrum, there is a repeated tendency for effective decisional authority to slide from one end toward the other.

Proposition 2. Bargaining and command relationships are influenced by chief executives' disposition and by objective capacity.

Proposition 3. Chief executives may be driven to attempt to assert command, or to allow bargaining. There are unpredictable acts based upon the person who occupies the chief executive role at the time.

The act of choosing is individually based upon his or her definition of the situation

Proposition 4: Whatever the disposition to exert command, the

action will also be a reflection of the actor's possession of the requisites for coercion, if there is resistance.

Proposition 5. Chief executives accept some bargaining and allow subordinates to do some of what subordinates want, contrary to their own preferences, because chief executives inherently have more to do than they can master personally.

Proposition 5.1: In large scale government, the next critical bargain -- more implicit than explicit -- concerns how much the chief executive will yield powers of decision to the executive entourage.

Proposition 5.2: Protocol simultaneously reflects and reinforces status.

Proposition 5.3: The bargain between the chief executive and members of the entourage is inherently unstable.

Proposition 5.4: Entourage politics becomes a more intensively competitive process of personal power than nearly any other part of the governmental process.

Proposition 5.5: Politics within the entourage must depend largely on face-to-face relations.

Proposition 5.6: Personal dependence imposes a demand for loyalty to the incumbent of the office at the moment.

Proposition 5.7: The award or signs of honor and station are

inducements, as shame and humiliation, the opposites of honor and station, are among the most powerful penalties.

Proposition 5.8: If shame and humiliation will not cause the individual to conform within the entourage, or to withdraw altogether, they may be used to deprive that person of credit before the rest of the world.

Proposition 5.9: If shame and humiliation will not cause the individual to conform within the entourage, or to withdraw altogether, they may be used to deprive that person of credit before the rest of the world.

Proposition 6. The stabilization of jurisdiction provides relief from combat.

Proposition 6.1: The conversion of personal servants into officials with defined functions is an endless process in government.

Proposition 6.2: Institutionalization redefines the chief executive-entourage bargain to the advantage of the latter.

Proposition 7. Between the entourage and the agencies, bargaining and command are ever regenerated.

Proposition 8: The department head is unique as the actor who

must simultaneously work as the chief executive's subordinate and as the superior official in an organization where other people may resist or accept command.

Proposition 8.1: The permanent tension between command over subordinates and bargaining with subordinates is more intense at the department head's level, than at any other. The reason is that both the nominal superiors and the nominal subordinates have the ability to impose punitive sanctions.

Proposition 8.2: There are four hazard criteria --appointment, removal, instruction, reorganization.

Proposition 8.3: Both personal pride and the ambition to protect political reputations may inspire department head to act more independently than chief executives would prefer.

Proposition 8.4: Chief executive incapacity to exert direct control is also a function of the number of departmental units to be controlled.

Proposition 8.5: Acceptance of, rather than mere obedience to, command is a matter of the internal states of department heads.

Proposition 8.6: The acceptance of command is strongly influenced by the department heads' trust or confidence in the purposes and values of their superiors, and their very clarity about those purposes and values.

Proposition 8.7: The acceptance of command is also closely

related to the feeling of being trusted by the superior.

Proposition 8.8: The acceptance of command is enhanced by the feeling that the superior is competent, "knows what he (she) is doing." The absence of such a feeling leads to a kind of disabling disappointment.

Proposition 8.9: The department heads' acceptance of command tends to be impeded by the role and power of the entourage since:

(a) the work of the entourage communicates that the department head is distrusted;

(b) the personalized competition for power within the entourage elicits distrust from the department heads;
and

(c) the hit-or-miss interventions of the entourage in substantive matters will often lead the department heads', closer to the substance, to be distrustful of the competence of the chief executive and those who advise him or her personally.

Proposition 8.10: Most department heads, most of the time, will be defeated in encounters where the entourage is determined to achieve some other result.

Proposition 8.11: The values likely to be found in the civil service will be those of the group that has longest dominated

the political process, to the extent of being able to establish its preferences as part of a broad consensus. A civil service without values is nonexistent, although a civil service capable of sublimating its own substantive values can be found.

Proposition 8.12: Department heads, recognizing their inability to act directly upon everything, enter de facto or tacit bargains with their own entourages.

Proposition 9. Department heads' ability to command, or necessity to bargain, will be influenced by three competing or conflicting rationalities in the selection of official subordinates: managerial rationality, representational rationality, and control rationality.