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## Chapter 01

### THE PRACTICE OF POWER

#### The Centrality of Administration to Power

This book is about the practice of power. Its dominating argument rests on the hypothesis of the centrality of administration to power. It is not merely that administration is important, which most people will concede. It is central.

Administration, as power in practice, reveals social realities, even to a degree that those who articulate social doctrine may wish to deny. The subject has for many years been studied as if it were uniquely related to efficiency, to problems of democracy, of the welfare state, to "bureaucracy," to complex organizations and in many other terms. These

questions have their merits. But they do not get to the core issue implied when Edward Gibbon refers to "the public administration." (Gibbon, I, 1.)<sup>1</sup>

The cruciality of administration is revealed in a newspaper account of a dramatic form of slippage away from the prescribed norm. The New York Times, Friday, June 6, 2008 said that Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates had fired the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. This was an extraordinary move. It was a decisive act of command

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<sup>1</sup>. Edward Gibbon (1737-1794) was the author of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, on which he spent twenty four years from 1764-1788. He was a member of the House of Commons during the American Revolution and held for a time the office of Commissioner of Trade and Plantations. (Crystal, 375.)

in a situation where there must have been considerable intra-agency discussion over many months. The activating factor was that "four high-tech electrical nose cone fuses for Minuteman nuclear warheads were sent to Taiwan in place of helicopter batteries." The report was also that "B-52 bomber had flown across the United States without anyone's realizing that it was carrying six armed nuclear cruise missiles." Thus, the newspaper reported the Defense Secretary's concern about "'structural, procedural, and cultural problems'" that led to mishandling of nuclear weapons material within the U. S. Air Force. (Shanker, 2008, A1 and A19)

#### 1. The Permanence of Politics

There is hardly any doubt that such a case would be described as "technical" or "professional" and not "political." The argument in this book is that this is fundamentally wrong. "Politics" is its center. In coming to that argument, the core assumption is that

politics - - the organization of power in human groups  
- - is a universal (Holden, 2000, 1-19). Politics is  
manifest in the nuclear and the extended families, the  
recreational group and the athletic world. It is also  
shown in the religious aggregation of all kinds, the  
business corporation,<sup>2</sup>

the trade union, and every other entity on which we  
have reports. (Merriam, 1944, Chapter 1) Human beings  
in groups compete, organize control over each other,  
exercise control, and correlatively how they avoid,  
evade, and overthrow control. (Scott, 1990). Control  
sometimes collapses altogether as people struggle for some new  
expression of control.

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<sup>2</sup>. The struggles over the control of corporations, daily reported in The Wall Street Journal, are as good a resource on basic political tactics as any of the reported conflicts about the control of public government.

Politics is full of tension. On one hand, it is a thought-based and consequence-evaluating process. To that extent it is rational. Rational can mean choosing the correct action by some objective standard. Neoclassical economics provided the "scientifically correct" standard for anti-trust policy, according one William F. Baxter, once an Assistant Attorney General. Every other policy choice, by that standard was irrational. Rational can also mean choosing the most effective means to an end. If one wanted to sustain smaller business firms, the neoclassical means did not do it, and one needed anti-trust law suits to break up larger units that Baxter would say operated more efficiently.

We do not need further to discuss the many versions of "rationality" (Rescher, 1988, for example, 3 on practical rationality and evaluative rationality.) But we do need to emphasize, contrary to many beliefs, the rationality of politics. Politics deals with

incommensurable things, for which no common and objective standard is possible. It is, at the same time, full of emotions, likes that will not yield, dislikes and even hatreds.

There is a fundamental intellectual problem than how the people participate in their own government. Nor is there a more fundamental practical problem than the people determining how they will participate. This seemingly simple, and normatively aspirational, question deserves a far deeper inquiry within an empirical political science.

## 2. The Task of Political Science

Political scientists have the task of working constantly to enhance the stock of knowledge upon which the rest of society may draw. Social resources are invested to allow us the time and assistance to conduct searches, make discoveries, and write what we see, under conditions of intellectual freedom that, always in some jeopardy, we must always defend. This may be

done well or poorly, and whether it is done well or poorly depends on what happens in the two realms of political science.

The intellectual realm consisting of the aggregate body of ideas and methods. Political science, as it is known today, is the crystallization of work over the past century. (But there is a "pre-political science," or a serious body of thought and study that reaches two thousand and five hundred years to ancient Greece, at the last.) The political science of the past fifty or sixty years has been dominated by the effort to break free of the pre-political science tradition. In many respects, that does embody an intellectual advance. But it is not all glorious and enlightening. Many ideas and perceptions are prematurely set aside or simply have been lost because they do not embody contemporary research techniques or the theories that are asserted to be "cutting edge."

This is a problem, in overwhelming part, of the organizational realm of a discipline. The organizational realm consists of editorial boards, sponsoring committees, peer review panels, departments and dissertation committees, grant making entities and others who determine what is legitimate political science at a given moment and what is not. (Holden, 2000, 1-19). This agreement constitutes the received canon of the discipline at any time.

When one asks how "the people participate in their own government," the issue is expressed in what seems typically American language. But it is not necessarily open to a pleasant and ethically satisfying answer nor limited only to the United States. It is, to adapt from Norton E. Long,<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>. Biographical note on Norton E. Long ( ), who was a student of Charles H. McIlwain ( ), a sometime research assistant to Carl J. Friedrich ( ), the author's own dissertation adviser. Note on the catholicity of Long's interests.

the central question of political power. Long wrote that for the administrative agency, the "attainment, cultivation, maintenance, (and) increase" of power as well as its "dissipation and loss are subjects the practitioner and the student can ill afford to neglect." (Long, 1949, 1962, .)

Long was correct, but did not go far enough. It is not merely that, as he wrote, "power is the life blood of administration." It is still more fundamentally that administration is the life blood of power. In order to get to the rest of this case, it is also necessary to summarize the context of the political

science of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries from which 21<sup>st</sup> century political science takes its origin.

The late 1800s and early 1900s political scientists principally concentrated on detailed description of what the law said about institutions, or on what newspapers and magazines reported about institutions. They similarly reported on explanation of political movements - - women's suffrage, unions, prohibition of alcohol sales and consumption and resistance to big corporations. They also reported on institutional changes brought about by American conquest of the Spanish imperial remnants in Asia, which made colonial administration a subject. They did not take note of the retrenchment within the country of the Civilk War victory and the 1890s' decision to leave the African Americans to the mercy of state's rights. They also dealt in prescriptions as to what forms of organization were best, such as popular election of senators,

municipal government reforms, civil service, centralization of state administration, and the adoption of an Executive Budget.

There are research and analytical practices common now that late 1800s political scientists could not do or could not know. Karl Pearson's product moment correlation was unknown until 1903 (?). Social customs and law did not permit political scientists to have direct opportunity to observe that politicians were doing off the public record. Hence, there was relatively little chance to observe and report on politics from the inside, as seen by decision-makers in high places. Many, many people have had Congressional fellowships, judicial fellowships, and executive/administrative internships from which many books and articles have been written.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>. Regrettably, many more books and articles from this collective experience will never be written, for a wide variety of practical reasons.

The intellectual techniques that made survey research possible had not been created. Lionel Robbins<sup>5</sup>

had not yet articulated the constructs essential to neo-classical economics (Robbins, 1931). Neo-classical economics should be emphasized because it is essential

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<sup>5</sup>. Bio note on Lionel Robbins and The Nature and Significance of Economic Science.

what is now called "rational choice" (Freedman, ed., 1995; Ferejohn and Kuklinski, ed., 1990) and what Ronald Coase more explicitly calls "the economic theory of politics." The computing technology that makes possible massive transfers of data did not exist.

In the late 1800s, and up to the first half of the 1900s, there was also relatively little study of "underlying" social and psychological dynamics, or organized study of "roots" of political behavior. (H. Hubert Wilson) Moreover, the articulation of the idea of "positive" theory, in contrast to the normative theory that derived from ancient Greek and Roman study, was little known until the 1950s.

Especially from the 1920s, and notably under the impact of Charles E. Merriam,<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>. Biographical note on Charles E. Merriam,

political scientists began to seek "deeper" social and psychological understandings of politics. They also began to move toward quantification and to abstract mathematical reasoning. The quantitative triumph is nearly complete, and the mathematical entry is widespread.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>. American Political Science Review

Despite these changes, the struggle for improvement in political science, has dramatically slowed since the 1970s. Political science now largely misses its legitimate aim of exploring empirically how power is practiced. With many exceptions, such as the work of Lyn Ostrom and others (Cite), the dominant theme is far removed from the spirit of Graham Wallas. Import the Wallas quotation. The assumption of the received canon of today's political science is that "the people" - - or as some say "the ultimate principals" - - have a power that, at any moment of their choosing, they may attain (or reclaim) and exercise through the mode of "the vote." From inquiry into how people vote, and how they acquire information for voting, comes the first high prestige field of political science namely "political behavior." (Ferejohn and Kuklinski, 1990.)

From this also comes the second high prestige field in political science, namely the avant study of

legislative politics grounded in models of rational choice. (Ferejohn and Kuklinski, 1990).

The political science, as we presently study and teach it, creates the intellectual conditions for drastic political surprise. Political surprise is the profoundly disturbing experience that could not be anticipated on the basis of research that the received canon would have allowed. It is similar to tornadoes or hurricanes in areas where common sense would not have predicted them and where meteorology would have offered no corrective common sense if anybody were willing to listen.

Political science does not contribute to the events of political surprise any more than meteorology contributes to tornadoes and hurricanes. But political science may claim the task to enable the people interested in their own government to anticipate tornadic and hurricane possibilities. It must fail to

do so precisely as it treats "the public administration" (Gibbon, I, 1) The received canon creates conditions for political surprise by forcing attention to questions that could not yield the right answer, no matter how coherent or elegant the theory or how sophisticated the methods.

One illustration of how this takes place is provided in a paper by Pablo T. Spiller (Spiller, 1990, 269-278.) Spiller is an economist but writes from the economic theory of politics in a collection published under the received canon sanctioned by the organizational realm and edited by two distinct political scientists (Ferejohn and Kuklinski, 1990).

Spiller says, correctly, that political markets are plagued with agency problems and that politics can be seen as a hierarchy of principal-agent relations.

"On top of the pyramid are the voters representing the ultimate principals. At the bottom of the pyramid are,

perhaps, the government bureaucrats. In between is a series of layers in which multiple principals and multiple agents interact." (Spiller, 278.)

Spiller says that this "depiction of the political arena may provide the impression that agents are free to pursue their own objectives almost independently of the interests of the ultimate principals (the voters)." His objective is to show that this is not true.

The modern theory of agency suggests that the rationale for most political institutions is to make agents choices closer those that would maximize political surplus. In many cases this would imply choices closer to those preferred by the principals." (Spiller, 269)

This description may be as Charles Lindblom once wrote of economic theory on the firm, a caricature of reality, and still be adequate for abstract model building (Lindblom, 1958, .) It may ultimately be productive. But under present conditions it neitgher

does, nor could pretend, to provide a good empirical analysis of the exercise of power through administration. Since we, in this book, are focused on the practice of power through administration, we must note his reliance on the influential work of McCubbins, et. al. on designing institutions to regulate regulators. (Spiller, 275.)<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>. Two points should be asserted here in anticipation of what is to come. (1) The “fire alarm”/“police patrol” model is very close to a more recent statement of the “bureaucracy in a democracy” analysis of Charles S. Hyneman, more than half a century ago. (2) The present author is skeptical that the depth of analysis of regulatory policy and procedure is much more than a blueprint, compared to an actual building. (3) Executive-administrative decision-making is not only about “regulation,” which is a significant, but modest, share of overall government compared to facilitation (or assistance) and entrepreneurship.

As Spiller notes, "McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) suggest that members of Congress will use their constituencies to control regulators through the 'fire alarm' process. That is, they will institute a review of the regulatory agency only after receiving enough complaints from their constituencies. Thus, there is no need for a continuous oversight (policing) of the agency. Even though there does not seem to be any oversight, the agency is under control." (275) Spiller continues at a later point, "Agency problems arise whenever there is delegation and imperfect information, natural characteristics of the political process." (Spiller, 287.) That is surely true enough.

As an exploration contained within the mind of the explorer, this sophisticated literature provides a major challenge. "Although the agency approach only recently has been applied formally to political science, the substantial discussion of agency issues in

politics should serve as a guide to further formal exploration of those topics." (278)

It provides, in short, no guidance to knowing how power is attained, cultivated, maintained and increased or how it is dissipated and lost. That is how it leaves conditions for the experience of political surprise to weather disturbance.

### 3. Illustrations of the Diversionary Effect of the Received Canon

Within the received canon, the recognition of public administration comes chiefly in tame forms that do not state its power-attaining and power-maintaining essentials. Under our guiding hypothesis, the practice of power is manifested in who has some degree of control over who kills whom (or protects whom). [ New York police case and adjudicated results. ]9

arly displayed in who makes money available to whom or takes it  
away from whom, [Massive IraQ Qwar contracting and  
supervision issues

, is displayed in who makes information (fact or doctrine)  
available to, or blocks their access to it by whom.  
(Bush Administration secrecy policies/but local  
govefrnment secrecy policies in Mississippi)

ention away from, rather than toward, inquiry into the practice of power. It does not encourage the graduate student to analyze Government projectively. Imagine that it is 1971. The graduate student would not have been encouraged to ask "What would the President's capability illegally to acquire information about domestic political opponents? What would be the capability to withhold information so as to mislead the Congress? What would be the capability to pay money in order to protect information that would injure the President's personal political own interest?"

Watergate" was in no way forecast and came as political surprise to be investigated and explained after the fact only.

are two authors who are indisposed to sweep under the rug serious criticisms of the American polity. However, students reading their text would have no idea from their chapters on the President and the Federal bureaucracy (346-411) that such questions could be asked of the political system.

not have encouraged the following inquiry prior to 1988. "What is the capability of the President, or immediate agents

in the Presidential entourage, to facilitate arms transfers to a proscribed nation (Iran)? What is the capability to use the financial proceeds to avoid the Congressional appropriations process, and facilitate Central American military operations that the President favors?" The received canon precluded discovery before of the Iran-Contra affair (Bradlee, ), again retrospective analysis all that was feasible.

id not allow study that would have forecast the capability of a President to initiate and conduct a war of the scale of that in Iraq, with the vast implications that it also contains.

Administrative Centrality Seriously

history

ely different circumstances say the same thing does not make it true. But it does give it sufficient credibility to stand as a testworthy hypothesis unless there is

something prima facie wrong with it. That is why intellectual history is a worthy point of departure.<sup>10</sup>

implicit in the "pre-political science" learning. (Holden, 1996, Chapters 1 and 2.) The information-money-force formulation is present in variety of theoretical writers of some weight in the "pre-political science" of the past.

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<sup>10</sup>. Intellectual history can be a worthy enterprise by itself, but that is not what is claimed here.

ooks for the instruction of royal rulers -- "mirrors for  
princes" -- common in Asia from the distant past and in  
Europe from the fifth through the fifteenth centuries.  
They contain what their writers thought compelling,  
much as editorials, magazine articles, and think-tank  
studies contain what authors think compelling today.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>. However, the reader is entitled to an explicit caution. J. H. Hexter, once a Yale historian, said these handbooks were "singularly vapid (in) character," "dreary," "cliche-ridden."  
(Hexter, 19??) Hexter's comment, which demands intellectual rigorousness, is similar to much of the comment today about approaches to politics by non-academic, extra-academic, and unrefereed writing.

books could see one set of rulers, acting as agents (in form, often merely clerks) for the other set of rulers. The very act of seeing called forth the comment.

b. Vignettes five hundred years apart: Ibn Khaldun and John Stuart Mill

Ibn Khaldun is a pertinent writer. He was an fourteenth century administrator and scholar, lived and worked at various times from Spain, Tunisia (as it now is) to Cairo. (Crystal (ed.). 479; Khaldun, 1958, xxix-lxvii; and, Rosenthal, 1962, 84-109. Khaldun's time put him a century before Columbus, or before the European world became commonly aware of the world on the western side of the Atlantic. His reported observation was that "the three basic pillars of . . . authority . . . are soldiers, money, and 'means to communicate with those who are absent.'" (Ibid. (Is this Journal of Political Economy, 1957 or Journal of Management Studies, later??? MH 2/25/91) In the terminology of

this book, they equate to force, money and its surrogates, and information.

John Stuart Mill, known in our time principally as a philosopher (and in the late nineteenth century as an economist) lived five hundred years after Khaldun. He, when empire was the norm of British politics. British expansion, exploration, and economic exploitation had outsourced in the 18th century to the East India Company, and supervised in some sense by East India House. Mill was also the bureaucrat son of a bureaucrat father.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>. Bio note on John Stuart Mill and James Mill at East India House.

Both Mill and his father (James Mill) had careers in East India House. Mill is known to us for 19th century, English, rationalist concepts of liberty, representative government, and political economy. His ideas are not thought completely to have come from the same intellectual pool as the ideas of Ibn Khaldun, Arab and Muslim. Yet Mill is virtually on all fours with Khaldun. Where Khaldun emphasized "soldiers," Mill referred to "muscular strength," where Khaldun referred to money, Mill spoke of "property," where Khaldun spoke of means to communicate those who were absent, Mill referred to "intelligence." (Mill, 196?. 245.)

Between the time of Khaldun and of Mill, there is other evidence from pre-political science. Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, when absolute monarchy was becoming the predominant mode of governing and representative institutions were struggling between

exhaustion and new assertion, has his own discussion of what 20th century people would surely have called staff and line. (This is discussed in further detail in Holden, 1996, .) David Hume and Edward Gibbon in the eighteenth century also saw administrative centrality. Hume and Gibbon knew of the history in which kings had the practical ability to have unwelcome parliamentarians killed. But that was gone in their time. They were in an age when representation had been institutionalized on a narrow basis. Monarchy was still an active part of governing. (Dobree, 1935, 1968). They could still see an executive-led government. (Hume, better known to us as a philosopher had a small part in that government. In 1765 he was in Paris as secretary to Lord Hertford, the ambassador.

nt General Conway about some letters and enclosures from a Captain Palliser. These concerned Newfoundland. "I think it would be . . . expedient that Mr. Hume should

with civility complain of the French ships of war that have visited the coasts of Newfoundland, and of the encroachments made by the French fishing vessels, as that will greatly destroy the fallacious arguments they will probably use in the Autumn as accusations against the Captain." (Bonamy, ed. 1935, 1968, 32) He knew, of course, a government in which the representatives were troublesome, but not in control.

## 2. Argument from institutional history

Public administration as a form of practice has been in the world for several thousand years, from the societies of the ancient Near East, well before the development of Rome. ( John A. Fairlie, )

Dwight Waldo, in the middle 20th century, commended to contemporary political science a study of Roman government and its significance for administration. (Waldo, The Enterprise of

Administration, ; also Samuel E. Finer, 1999, 3 Vols. .)

When the Roman republic had gone, and the empire was established, the term "chief executive" would by no means have been inappropriate. The claims that imperators (emperors) made for themselves were not bigger than claims made by some officials called "president" in some countries since World War II.) Concepts of law and administration have been adapted over the centuries, notably in the prefectoral systems of France and Italy, where there are areal representatives to represent the central government as whole, not merely the functional representatives for each of the agencies. They even re-present themselves in the Catholic Church structure where the diocese is an adaptation of the Roman province.

Roman republican government and administration

Roman government comes within the cultural milieu of the 21st century. Pontius Pilate is a symbolic character known wherever the Bible is read. Pontius Pilate was a field administrator - - an agent of the central government. Every system has to make decisions in some way about the persons to represent the central decision-makers, about the missions, authority, and functions that the representatives shall have; and about the geographical areas within which field personnel shall represent central decision-makers. Pilate is known known to us for the Christian account of the crucial decision that Pilate was called on to make, which leaves with common speech the term of "washing one's hands of it."

Edward Gibbon classifies five emperors as notably good. The happiest time of the Roman empire, he says, was when "the public administration was conducted by the virtues and abilities of Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, and the Antonines. (Gibbon, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, page 1. )

Domitian (81-96) has a notably bad reputation. It is charged to him that he ordered St. John, the last of the Apostles, exiled to the island of Patmos.

ropedia/Ready Reference, , 1998, 198; The Zondervan Pictorial Encyclopedia of the Bible, ( 1975, 1976, 619.) Adel Yarbro Collins, 1984, 55) "Victorinus and Eusebius say that the Revelation was written during the reign of Domitian. They add that John was banished to Patmos by Domitian and that he was released when Domitian died." No one knows if this is true or what the reason might have been. IMPORT THE CITATION ON THE BOOK OF REVELATION It might not be accounted ill, in his time, for Domitian to punish one of the disciples. But, as a matter of reality, in any polity, it would be counted ill if "he thoroughly alienated the ruling class by his rapacity and tyrannical ways." (Crystal, 284.) The same source says that "Becoming paranoid about opposition after the armed revolt of Saturninus, the Governor of Upper Germany (89), he unleashed a reign of terror in Rome which lasted until his own

assassination." This would provide a rational explanation of how Nerva, one of Gibbon's good emperors, might have come have some complicity in Domitian's death. It would be similar in moral tone to the assassination plot against Adolf Hitler that failed.

English governmental history is broadly reviewed in the work of and Thomas F. Tout for the medieval period.(Tout, ) It is covered, in part, by the work of G. R. Elton for the Tudor period, ( Elton,) and by John Brewer for the hundred years from the Glorious Revolution to the end of the American War of Independence ( Brewer,1990), to which we return in Chapter in further analysis of the politics of information.

The United States' administrative history similarly embodies both the extension of United States power over the

continent and, at the same time, the assertion of power within the body politic by some over others.

Force: Public administration via the Army over the Indian nations

The failure of force: Navy against the slave trade, with virtually no effect

Money and its surrogates: land administration

Information and money: the Post Office

Information and force: the U. S. Attorneys and the Federal courts

In keeping with the main thesis, the practice of power in the 19th century illustrates the working of the United States as a slave society, a subject little recognized in political science.

An American doctoral candidate can go a full period of training in a good political science/public

administration program and hear no substantial discussion of the subject.<sup>13</sup>

compensation of owners of slaves killed or injured in military service, about smuggling of newly seized Africans in the United States in violation of the laws after 1808, and the capture of persons who had departed slave status and gone to free life under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.

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<sup>13</sup>. Recent Australian comparison on subject of aboriginal population?

These matters are essentially the phenomena they presented in the generic problems of public administration. In managing the 20th century United States, and there is no reason to see much change within the first decade of the 21st, someone within an organization lays a claim for space [an office, a corner of the tool shop, or seminar room in which all participants can talk to each other's faces, rather than some talking to the backs of other people's heads], new word processor [a simple equipment buying problem], installation of a new computer system [decision about budget and equipment], the use of a desk assigned to someone else but not in use, forms to get someone paid [payroll, and a morale problem if the employee's check had not been properly issued on time]; for an airplane ticket or the use of an agency car [which may be a budget problem, a procurement problem or both].]

James W. Fesler and Donald F. Kettl, two scholars of a pro-governmental tradition, have a more or less typical coverage in a chapter identified the astronaut Neil Armstrong as civil servant.

It is not possible to have an organization without people in it to do its work. In public administration terminology this is usually called "personnel." Later, it was sometimes called "human resources." In new language made fashionable since the Republicans came to the control of Congress in 1995 it is sometimes called "work force." The distinction appears to be that calling people human resources was thought by 20th century Americans to imply a strong consideration for their well-being, whereas calling them work force may imply a greater possibility of their being at the disposal of management for the needs of the enterprise. This easily involves, in a country with a anti-government culture, the necessity for those who regard government

as legitimate to make the point that the growth of government employment (38% over their base period) had not kept up with the growth of total employment (43%). Nor, they argued, was it excessive compared to other 22 other countries. The first ranking they report is Norway with 32%, the lowest Japan with 8.1%, and the United States was at rank 14 with 15.5%. Both arguments are in opposition to the conservative argument that "runaway" government is damaging to the United States.

Recruitment is a generic problem. Every system must find the people who would be willing to take on a job or a position and choose the ones who are most to be preferred. This slides directly into the appointment decision. There are issues inside this decision. In the United States one of the longest standing issues is preference for military veterans. In the United States, India, and perhaps some other countries affirmative

action for persons who are members of categories deemed previously victimized or discriminated against arbitrarily is an important part of the personnel decision. [ "Position classification" can be seen as a term that is completely technocratic and depends upon professional knowledge only. This is not true. If someone in authority wants to hire someone else, he or she may need to find s means to "classify" job so that the ascertainable qualities of the person will fit the specifications of the job. But there is nothing objective about the determination.

There are other questions.

How are people to be promoted from one position to another?

How are they to separated (which means retired, discharged, etc.)?

How are their methods and amounts of pay to be calculated?

What employee rights and obligations are to be recognized?

Shall employees be allowed to be members of unions and, if so, how is collective bargaining to be conducted? What legal rights of privacy shall public employees be allowed? What are the rights to run for office, to express political opinions, or to vote? (Cayer, 1986, Second Edition; Maranto and Schultz, 1991; and, Royal Institute of Public Administration, . )

## Budgeting

Acceptance of the idea of a techno-logic is equally observed in the doctrine of professionals that they should be "left alone" to do "their" jobs. The emphasis on a techno-logic equates presumed technical merit with "rationality" and construes "politics" as adverse to "rationality." By this test "rational" action is deemed preferable. Who could doubt the preferability of rational action, if the alternative were decision-making by those who lost their reason? But the idea of

rationality that is applied is understood to mean decision-making without disputes that "get in the way" because they embody "irrelevant" values and interests.

Experienced administrators in particular, speak of administration or management in these terms quite routinely. This claim may be taken seriously by some who say it. And there must be some circumstances in which this should be taken seriously. But, for the most part, it is a claim of sovereignty over what "the job" is and being "left alone" means being left to define what the job is.

In the United States, and we should forecast in other countries, this is true of military officers and of policemen, of school teachers and of child social workers, and of all other occupations.

If that narrow meaning of "rationality" is what people mean, then they who follow it seek what are but mirages on

the human landscape. [Cf. Fiorina on rational vs. crazy  
in Ferejohn and Kuklinski.]

## Visibility Politics

The cases that we have mentioned before fall with the  
administrative equivalent of high politics. That is,  
they involve lamorous subjects. However, the practice  
of power does not take place on a grand scale merely.  
Power is practiced at low visibility levels that some  
may deem not political at all. Herein lies a profound  
failure of perception. The discretion and decision-  
making capacity open to most people in a given agency  
may be "small," "narrow," and "officially" irrelevant  
to the policy ends that may be sought.

It can be saturated with micropolitics ( or interpersonal  
politics). People known as "street level bureaucrats"

(Lipsky, 196??) often exercise power over others at a low level of visibility.<sup>14</sup>

The farther down the social hierarchy X is, the greater the proportion of life's daily transactions in which X has

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<sup>14</sup>. In actual practice, “low visibility” chiefly means that each individual decision by a public administrator is unlikely to be seen by those who hold higher offices (see chapters below) or by anyone who can speak in the interest of the person being acted upon. It is, for instance, not likely to be the subject of intermediation by a member of a representative body and is even less likely to be subject of a more severe form of action (oversight, legislation, or punishment) by a member of a representative body (below, chapters .)

the choice is to submit or to be overtly rebellious. When X stands very little (if any) chance of going effectively beyond the street-level bureaucrats to the street-level bureaucrats' supervisors, X has entered an empirical demonstration of the scope of "administrative law-lessness." (Hewart, 1929, 43-57.)

Petty authority/face to face tyranny .-. One form of micropolitics is simple petty authority (or face-to-face tyranny). The administrative functionary may teach the applicant -- often by explicit instruction -- that "in order to get what you want, you have to satisfy me!" Petty authority puts in basic human terms the idea that power is the capacity of X to induce Y to do something that Y would rather not do. Face-to-face tyranny is often, though perhaps not always, grounded in the human tendency to retreat in the face of embarrassment and shame.

However, the same human pride and ego that generate shame avoidance also generate resistance. Within the very smallest cases, human transactions reappear in the exercise of power by one person over another, and the resistance of the subordinate to the putative superior. In the University of Virginia, in the early 1990s, a severe fiscal crisis appeared. The highest level University authorities made policy decisions to protect the educational mission by conserving other financial expenditures.

Among other things, this meant handling the cleaning services for buildings differently. Hardly anyone at the University's central level of authority would ever imagine the cleaning problem to be "political." Nonetheless, the authority tension could be seen in the buildings at night.

The problem could be observed in the building occupied by the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs. One

woman did not get enough waste baskets emptied into gurneys fast enough. Not enough gurneys were ready to go to the dumpster before some of the night supervisor's crew were to begin going home. This meant that the dumpster was not filled on time. Doubtless, this meant that the night supervisor expected (or received) complaint from her supervisor. Her instruction (or, maybe merely nagging admonition) to the cleaning woman was "reach down in there and get it." The woman who physically mopped the floors and emptied the wastebaskets complained to the third party bystander about her supervisor. "She wants me to put my hands down in the waste baskets." The tone of abuse, resentment, and defiance was obvious.

But to this woman, the baskets were "nasty," and she said "I am not going to do that."

This was a "political" transaction as much as others, but it simply lacked visibility to those at the highest

levels. It would have visibility if work disputes began to show up in overt labor resistance to management, expressed in financial demands, or in the frequency of filthy and unpleasant classrooms.

Petty authority may also emerge as some functionary's being able to tyrannize over some other person, in the interest of someone of higher status, thus defending the class structure. Harold Macmillan, the late British Prime Minister, and his wife were on a political trip. Macmillan recounted that when a man shouted "an insulting and very obscene remark." The nearby Police Superintendent struck the man in the face with a glove. Some months later the Superintendent said the man had complained that his tooth was broken. The Superintendent's reply had been "'Lucky for you, me lad, that me 'and wasn't in the glove.'" (Macmillan, )

Administration can take the form of slips or inadvertent failures in routine. When Lovat Dickson, the British literary

critic, was sixteen, he had false military papers showing him nineteen. (Dickson, 1960, 144.) The papers helped him get a job as a social caseworker (called Administrative Clerk) in Montreal. His task was to deliver in person monthly cash payments to war widows. The agency had already judged that these women were insufficiently responsible to get their money through the mail.

His supervisor, had explained carefully his role. He would be "the 'government', the source from which their money came, the power that could withhold it." (Dickson, ) This must mean that the Administrative Clerk carried money to these clients in cash. If he delivered checks, those might as well have been sent by mail. She had emphasized that the clients were to respect him, that without their respect, trust, and in the end their affection, he would be able to do

ely a heavy load for any young man, and this boy was but  
sixteen.

From the internal evidence, it must be that the social  
caseworker went from house to house with a supply of  
cash that he was to allocate. It must also have been  
true that the recipients had to account to the social  
caseworker for how they were living.

One client disappeared, her daughters (more or less his own  
age) made unconvincing explanations (or at least  
explanations that did not meet the requirements). The  
predictable occurred. The predictable occurred.

oy would dream took place. (Dickson, )

The ramifications are manifold. But the one conclusion is the  
young man's opportunity for sexual gratification cannot  
have been an intended result. It cannot even have been  
known by his superiors.

Even so, it has a variety of authority implications for those  
amongst whom he worked. Was it a matter of mutual

convenience between two young people? Was it sexual exploitation or harassment? (In this part of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is likely that feminist-oriented political scientists might see such an issue.) Was it the dominance by an Anglo-Australian in Canada over French clients? (This question might appear if a political scientist were attuned to issues of public administration in a plural society, where ethnic stratification is a factor. [Holden, 1996, 208-248.] ) Did other clients never hear of this? Was Dickson the only young man to work for the agency? Was this the sole occasion, or was he able to treat it as a regular side benefit?

Slippage may yield small departures from the prescribed norms that may aggregate to vast difference from the "policy" as formally adopted.<sup>15</sup>

Ultra vires presumptively rational personal decision.-. Personal decision where personal decision is not formally allowed is another form of micropolitics. Such personal decision can be seen such an apparently routine matter. Some years ago, a justice of the peace in Tarrant County, Texas (John Forbes) refused to perform a marriage. The prospective groom was Black and the prospective bride white. "I have established the policy," the justice was quoted as saying, "of not performing underage marriages as well as inter-racial marriages." He was

quoted further as saying, "These marriages are well established as having a high incidence of failure."

(Source?) However, the Texas justice of the peace has nothing to do with setting the policies on who is marriageable to whom. The Attorney General of the State later ruled so. (Source) Yet this action by the justice of the peace, precipitating the need for the ruling, presents a situation in which other people would have to anticipate his action (or that of his counterparts) if they were in similar positions.

More recently, in the United States, there has been a similar assertion of discretion when local officials have claimed the right to perform ceremonies designated as marriages between persons of the same sex.

Inequality in the ability to appeal.-. Finally, we see a form of micropolitics in the question of appeal from an adverse decision on a routine matter -- no matter how "objective" the rules for that decision.

Routine is politicized to the extent that dissatisfied claimants have unequal capacity to appeal beyond the initial level of decision, with some chance of having the original decision reversed. The very identification of such people who do have a realistic capacity to appeal may cause low-level decision-makers to alter the previously "mandatory" decisions. There is another side of the appeal problem. The practice of pure routine may be "bureaucracy" in the sense used by Brian Crozier, namely the organization that has no ability to correct its own errors.<sup>1</sup>

In this sense, bureaucracy can be seen as "dehumanizing." This means "bad" treatment that the applicant cannot get anyone else to consider on its merits or as a matter of mercy.<sup>16</sup>

The human being might become a mere animate object if all claims were to go to people "bound" by the

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<sup>16</sup>. Goldsmith on prisoners in Guantanamo and habeas corpus. Pfiffner's book on executive power and chapter on habeas corpus

"machinery" to render claims to his or her disadvantage. ( Contemporary credit bureau issues. )

The practice of power in such low visibility offers many occasion where there is a need for a more serious political science. This is is most patent concerning institutionalized persons. They are fully under administrative control. As members of classes and sometimes as individuals they cannot effectively protect themselves. The reasons for their troubles are different. But they are all under administrative control. They seem systematically and routinely to treated as less worth real protection than are other people who can speak for themselves or have others who asre both well informed and ready to act in their behalf.

For example, in the United States, one of the major problems reported in the newspapers concerns law suits and legislative hearings about institutional care

failures in the handling of of old people who cannot walk for themselves, feed themselves, or clean themselves, (Selden,) mentally handicapped persons, of children, and of prisoners (Margo Schlanger?).

\*\*\*Goldsmith\*\*\*

#### PRACTICE THROUGH THREE MECHANISMS OF POWER

Political surprise can be minimized to the extent that we can know what to expect in the conduct of administration, whether we approve or disapprove of the expected. In particular, we do so by explication of three mechanisms of power.

The first mechanism consists in the structure (pattern) within which chief executives, executive entourages (sometimes called "staff"), and operating entities give and receive direction. (Holden, 1988, 255-276.)

In the United States, the central portion is the Presidency. But the analytical issues do not limit

themselves to the United States only. Nor do the analytical limit themselves to the Federal Government only. They are, under the terms of this book, found wherever human governance is found. This means that they refer to the governors of the states, the mayors of cities and to all other unit heads, foreign and domestic, public and private.(Holden, 1988, 255-276.)

(B) The second mechanism meets the problem of field administration. (Below chapter on "the visible presence of government".) Field administration is the set of processes by which decisions are proclaimed and transmitted into the body politic. It is the means by information, warnings and signals indicating cooperation, compliance or rebellion will be made manifest.

The recurrent problem is (A) whether rather tight control shall be exercised from the central offices to the Nth agency functionary, (B) whether authority shall

be devolved so that there is little attempt at review from the center, or © whether there shall be a system of negotiated power-sharing.

Central control is the form that textbook administrative theory has most often led experts, consultants, and commentators to prescribe. The theory of central control implies perfect hierarchy.

Imperfect hierarchy consists in devolution wherein the responsibility is placed upon officials of some lower-level unit, with little central supervision. Imperfect hierarchy also exists in various contracting and outsourcing arrangements where public authority is effectively transferred to some private entity.

Negotiated power-sharing (when the "superior" level of government needs the cooperation of a lower level of government. Officials at some lower level may theoretically be able to refuse to act, but as a practical matter may not be free to refuse some measure

of cooperation. Conversely, officials at some higher level may claim authority, but as a practical matter may not be able in reality to preempt the actions of lower officials with whom they do not agree.)<sup>17</sup>

The third mechanism exists in some polities, but does not exist in others. It is the optional institutions and processes through which constraints are imposed upon administration. (Below chapters on assemblies.)

Discretion must be exercised all the time. But this does not mean that those who exercise discretion have prerogative or a will uncontrolled by any other

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<sup>17</sup>. Imperfect hierarchy and negotiated power sharing are among the practical circumstances that do not appear within the present scope of the economic theory of politics, as noted in Spiller (above ) as applied to administration.

will. Perhaps some can act that way. But not for long. Constraint (persuasive or coercive) is also a permanent fact. Constraint is limitation, but constraint is also imperative direction. To constrain is to force, compel, or oblige. (Random House Webster's College Dictionary, 1995, 292) One of the most significant institutional expressions is found in the transactions between those whose primary domain is the administrative and those whose primary domain is representative.

Collective bodies ("legislatures" or "assemblies") are the principal constraining institutions, though adjudicative bodies ("courts") also provide means for this end result. (Below, chapters\_\_\_) The distinction between "constitutional" or "democratic" governmental systems is in the degree to which there is effective constraint.

Summary of Chapter 01 and Plan of the Remainder

This book the practice of power rests on the hypothesis of administrative centrality. There is hardly any doubt that such administration can be described "technical" or "professional" and not "political." Such description, under the hypothesis of administrative centrality, is wrong. Administration is, to paraphrase Norton E. Long, the life blood of power. The organization of power in human groups - - is a universal (Holden, 2000, 1-19) and discretion about the actual use of information, money and its surrogates, and force imperative.

Political scientists have the task of working constantly to enhance the stock of knowledge upon which the rest of society may draw. With the enhancement of advanced methodologies, and much new theory, since the 1970s, political science has lost much of its ambition to perform in that mode.

Within the received canon, the recognition of public administration comes chiefly in tame forms that do not state its power-attaining and power-maintaining essentials. Let us restate the essentials. The practice of power is manifested in who has some degree of control over who kills whom (or protects whom). [ \*\*\*New York police case and adjudicated results.\*\*\* ] The parallel statement can also be about the collection and allocation of money and the collection and dissemination of information.

There is support for this hypothesis from intellectual history sufficient to give it credibility to stand as testworthy. In the search for such intellectual history, we have turned to the "mirrors for princes," vignettes of Ibn Khaldun and John Stuart Mill, five hundred years apart, and other scholars such as Thomas Hobbes and David Hume.

We also find (or search for) supporting argument in institutional history. Public administration as a form of practice has been in the world for several thousand years, from the societies of the ancient Near East, well before the development of Rome. ( John A. Fairlie, ) and extends in recognizable forms to our own history.

The generic problems of public administration are, of course, manifest in the academic programs of American universities and stated in such work as that of the esteemed James W. Fesler and Donald F. Kettl. In addition to the high politics facets that can be seen in public administration there is a pervasive micropolitics of public administration. It can take four forms: petty authority/face to face tyranny; Slippage that is inadvertent failures in routine; . Ultra vires action that is presumptively rational but reflects personal decision only; and Inequality in the ability to appeal.

Within the approach stated above, the remainder of this book is devoted to the problem of how people participate in their own government is always related to the avoidance of political surprise. Part of the question is whether people can know what to expect in the conduct of administration, whether they approve or disapprove of the expected. In particular, this should drive political science to the explication of three mechanisms of power.

Mechanism One consists in the structure (pattern) that engages chief executives, executive entourages (sometimes called "staff"), and operating entities in the giving and receiving of executive direction.

Mechanism Two meets the problem of field administration.

Mechanism Three exists in some polities, but does not exist in others. It is the optional institutions and processes through which constraints are imposed upon administration. (Below chapters on assemblies.)

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