March 5, 2004

By R. K. Ramazani

In February Iran will celebrate the 25th anniversary of its Islamic Revolution. Yet, in all probability the regime will be haunted by most of the same domestic and foreign policy issues that it has encountered since the eruption of the revolution in 1979. I will try to allude to some of these issues in broad strokes within the limited scope of this essay.

Domestic Challenges

Domestically, the issues of political and economic liberalization are of great importance. For political liberalization to mean anything would require acceptance of the principle of popular sovereignty. In adopting a new name for Iran after the revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the revolution, rejected out-of-hand the demand of the nationalists and Islamic modernists to add the modifier "Democratic" to the phrase Islamic Republic. But Iran's pro-democracy movement is a century old and stronger today than ever before. Many people also opposed the draft constitution. It embodied the contradictory principles of the people's sovereignty and the God-given sovereignty of a qualified cleric. The doctrine of "Viceregency of Jurisprudent" (velayat-e faqih), aimed in 1979 at Khomeini's overriding goal of establishing a "Government of God" in Iran.

To date these contradictory principles permeate the entire political structure and processes in Iran. Some hard-line conservatives accept the "absolute" (mutlaq) rule of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei. But some moderate conservatives construe his constitutional powers in a more limited way. Yet, the Supreme Leader remains unaccountable directly to the people. He is selected by an elected Assembly of Experts, which has the power to remove him if he fails in his duties. But the candidates for the elections of the Assembly are screened by a powerful Council of Guardians, half of whose members are appointed by the Supreme Leader himself. Many reformists characterize this system as "religious absolutism." Secular nationalists and even some enlightened clerics, on the other hand, analogize the Supreme Leader to ancient monarchs who also combined temporal and spiritual authority in their person. In other words, they see today's Supreme Leader as "the faqih of the faqihs" (faqih al-fuqaha), just as an ancient monarch was viewed as "the king of kings."

Except for local elections, the Council of Guardians has the power to disqualify candidates for parliamentary and presidential elections. The debate over the powers of the Council centers on its role in elections. Should its role in the Elections Law be construed as merely "supervisory"(esteshabi), or "approbatory" (estesvabi)?

The conservative-reformist differences over the role of the Council are bound to intensify during the extremely sensitive parliamentary elections in February this year. From the elections of the First Majlis in 1980 the membership of the parliament was dominated variously by the blocs of the Islamic Right and the Islamic Left. But for the first time the reformist camp won a landslide victory in the elections of the Sixth Majlis in February 2000.

Given the increasing frustration of many reformers with the snail pace of social and political reforms, speculations about the level of people's participation in parliamentary elections widely differ. Some reformers fear a low turnout, while others foresee a 55% or more participation rate. Should a great majority of the people fail to participate in the elections, some reformers believe, it could result in the delegitimation of the hard-line conservative-dominated system. Even if the Council should refrain from massive disqualification of candidates, it still has the power to overturn the outcome of the elections, just as it has the power to set aside parliamentary laws that it considers in contravention of "Islamic Law" (shari'a) or of the constitution.

The pivotal domestic issue that will face the regime in 2004 as it has ever since the revolution is its sick economy. To begin with, Iran is a rentier state that depends on oil revenues for 80% of its foreign exchange earnings. It is hostage, therefore, to the vagaries of world oil market prices. The ideal of an "oil-less"economy, first advocated by the late Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Musaddiq in the 1950's, has eluded Iran. Revolutionary chaos and the rush in the early 1980's to nationalize banks and industries in effect crippled what little had existed of the private sector. And the eight years of war with Iraq caused huge infrastructural problems, in addition to great human cost.

Furthermore, other socioeconomic difficulties will in all probability continue in the year 2004. State monopoly of the economy, partly through unruly "foundations" (bonyad-ha) and rampant corruption as well as incompetent economic management, contribute significantly to the high rates of inflation, officially estimated at 11.4%, and unemployment, at 13.8%. Unemployment is by far the more serious of the two problems. Given the fact that the majority of the Iranian population is under the age of thirty, unemployment hits youth the hardest. An estimated 220,000 university-educated young people are out of work and it is highly unlikely that the creation of some 800,000 jobs a year would stem the tide of rising unemployment, which is beyond the capacity of the present economy to handle. The absolute need for the infusion of domestic and especially foreign capital remains unmet. Xenophobic attitudes, bureaucratic red tape, and outdated, contradictory laws and regulations tend to chase capital and brain power out of the country. Iran aspires to joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), but it cannot at the moment meet the organization's membership standards, especially a freemarket economy.

Foreign Policy Challenges

The difficulties in the way of reintegrating Iran into the world economy get intertwined with serious foreign policy issues. No other issue at the moment seems as crucial as the shape of Iran's future relations with the United States. The principle reason for this is the drastic change in Iran's regional circumstances since the tragic terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.

The American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; the unprecedented rise in American military presence in these countries as well as the Persian Gulf region and Central Asia; and President Bush's inclusion of Iran, together with Iraq and North Korea, in the "axis of evil" have made national security Iran's number one priority. Even before these momentous events so dramatically changed the Iranian regional environment, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright aptly said that Iran lives in "a dangerous neighborhood."

American assurances and positive actions to dispel Iran's sense of grave threat to its security and stability are essential. In response to reporters in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in the ancient city of Bam on 26 December 2003, President Khatami cast doubt on December 30, 2003 on the idea that American humanitarian assistance, for which Iran was thankful, could assuage Iranian fears or help relations with America to move forward. He said "They (US) keep saying that they want to overthrow the Islamic Republic. We have not seen good intentions. We hope that the United States will change its behavior so that this wall of mistrust will break." Yet, two days later President Bush said more than enough to confirm Iranian suspicions of American motives. On the first day of 2004 he said that "we've got great compassion for human suffering" and yet in the same breath he gratuitously repeated U.S. demands, that "The Iranian government must listen to the voices of those who long for freedom, must turn over al-Qaeda that are in their custody and must abandon their nuclear weapons program...." On the same day Secretary of State Colin L. Powell also repeated the mantra that "we...stand by the Iranian people, and others living under oppressive regimes, as they strive for freedom," declaring "the 21st century will be a century of liberty worldwide."

Many conservatives and even some reformists interpreted these statements as the continuation of the Bush administration's efforts to interfere in Iranian affairs by playing the Iranian people against their government. Many Iranians found them contrary to the administration's own previous rhetoric. U.S. officials had said the administration did not seek "regime change" in Iran; it had praised Iran for its help in Afghanistan and Iraq and had welcomed Iran's signing the additional protocol to NPT aimed at intrusive inspections of covert efforts by Iran to develop nuclear weapons.

Despite Bush's untimely and insensitive remarks, the Iranian government is willing in principle to resume conversations with American officials on Iraq and other issues. These talks had been broken off by Washington in May, 2003. This willingness is not new. As a matter of historical fact, revolutionary Iran has never closed the door on resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States.

yatollah Khomeini himself had declared that Iran would do so "if America behaves itself" (agar adam beshavad). And the Iranian interest in dialogue with the United States has intensified since the reformist President Khatami took power. He proposed the idea of exchange of professors, athletes and others between the peoples of Iran and the United States. Against this backdrop it is reasonable to interpret the Iranian stance on the American offer to dispatch a high-level humanitarian mission to Iran, headed by Senator Elizabeth Dole, as more a matter of postponing the visit by the mission rather than rejecting it. Reportedly the Iranian officials had cited the overwhelming difficulties facing relief workers in the earthquake-stricken city of Bam as the reason Iran could not accommodate the American offer at the time.

The litany of grievances and differences between Iran and the United States over the past quarter of a century are well-known. But less noticed is that both sides have interests in moving forward toward sustained dialogue and reduction of tensions aimed ultimately at the resumption of diplomatic relations. The majority of the people of Iran are pro-democracy and want relations with America. But Iran needs to see the removal of American sanctions, a move which could significantly aid attracting badly needed capital and technology from other industrial countries as well as from the United States for economic development and privatization. That would require at least in part the removal of many financial, legal and bureaucratic bottlenecks.

I hope that Iran will stick to its obligations under the NPT and the additional protocol without prejudice, of course, to developing its nuclear reactors. Efforts to go nuclear would greatly strain Iran's languishing economy and instigate regional states to emulate its example contrary to its own longtime preachment of the goal of denuclearization of the Middle East. Israel must desist from threatening military action and the United States must aid Iran's legitimate right under the NPT to develop its nuclear capability for peaceful purposes.

On the other hand, the United States has interest in Iran's continued cooperation in the processes of stabilization of Iraq. Iran has recognized the American-appointed Governing Council. It has also refrained from interfering in Iraq either directly or through the Iranian-trained Iraqi Badr Brigade. Washington also has serious interest in continued Iranian aid to the reconstruction and political stabilization of Afghanistan and in Iran's cooperation in stemming the rising tide of drug trafficking through its long and porous borders with Afghanistan.

The security of the flow of uninterrupted oil supplies from the Persian Gulf to world markets is a vital interest of the United States as well as Iran. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war in 1991 the former President Bush declared that "our vital national interests" depend on a secure and stable Gulf. The pre-1991 American projection of military power "over the horizon" did not insure that security and stability. Nor can the present American imperium in the region. As early as 1982 this author, as an academic consultant to the United Nations Secretariat General, suggested that the United Nations should play a crucial role in the security of the region. And in the wake of the Persian Gulf war in 1991, I suggested in my "Future Security in the Persian Gulf: America's Role" that America should encourage regional security by the regional states, but tie such a regional grouping to the Security Council through Article 53 of the UN Charter which requires Security Council authorization before regional groupings may use military force. After two wars, is it not time to put the United Nations in the Persian Gulf in collaboration with the eight regional states, and could not such a strategy reduce the human and material costs that Pax Americana creates?

This essay was published in German in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 23 February, 2004.

R. K. Ramazani is Professor Emeritus of Politics at the University of Virginia. He has published extensively on the Middle East and is the author of Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East.