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JAMES HUNTER

James D. Hunter
Professor of Sociology and Religious Studies and Director of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture, U.Va.
"Exploring Global Fundamentalism"
September 15, 2003

There's a great deal one could say about religious fundamentalism and I will only scratch the surface here. I should say at the outset that I approach this phenomenon not as an expert in world religion, so don't push me too far because my knowledge of world religion really is very limited. I approach this as a cultural sociologist interested in the ongoing power and vitality of religion in the modern and post-modern world, and its consequences in individual life, and social and political affairs. Well, surely the first thing one can say about the concept of fundamentalism is that there are good reasons to abandon it altogether. The term has been used rather recklessly as just another synonym for religious dogmatism, or ideologically rooted authoritarianism of whatever historical manifestation. The book's strong religion, for example, defines fundamentalism as, and I quote, an aggressive enclave movement with absolutist, reactive, and errantist tendencies, end quote. This strongly negative depiction does not capture the nuances of modern religious groups or movements. If fundamentalism merely denotes strong belief in core doctrines of faith, then what distinguishes an ardent church go-er, or mosque attendee, from a reactive terrorist. It's important to remember that the origins of the term fundamentalism, derives from the very specific historical experience of American Protestantism, in the late 19th and early 20th century. To simply apply the term universally without regard of the national setting, the particular history of religious faith, whether the religion is a dominant or minority faith, and a host of other factors would seem to make its broad usage impossible. Certainly, for every generalization that can be made about religious fundamentalism, so called, one could probably found an exception. And yet, having acknowledged this, there do appear to be certain family resemblance, if you will, formal properties that are shared and that make it imprudent to ignore. I think one can speak of fundamentalism as both genus and species. The focus my talk this morning is an attempt to find the genus, the defining categories of fundamentalism, globally.

The great pretence of all fundamentalism, of whatever stripe, of whatever species, is their conviction that what they espouse, and what they seek to promote, is a basic, unaltered orthodoxy. This, I would argue, is not the case at all. orthodoxy as a cultural system represents what could be called a consensus through time, more specifically, a consensus based upon the ancient rules and precepts and beliefs derived from divine revelation. Its authority and its legitimacy derived from an unfaltering continuity with truth as originally revealed. Truth in its primitive and its purest expression. Fundamentalism, it is fair to say something else. In a word, fundamentalism is orthodoxy in confrontation with modernity, and Western modernity in particular. The argument can be framed this way: sociologically, all religious traditions confronting the modern world, its rationality, its pluralism, its public/private dualism, its secularity, are faced with three broad options. One option is that the religious community, as bearers of a tradition, can withdraw from engagement. In this there is the principled refusal to deal with the outside world beyond what is absolutely necessary for survival. The community becomes for all practical purposes, a closed and total world caring for its own educational, medical, commercial and spiritual needs. The archetypal example of this is found amongst the Amish, or the old order Meddinnite and Brethren community, and some forms of Hasidic Judaism such as Satmarhasidism. A second option, after withdrawal, is can follow is to simply accommodate the traditions to the social and cultural forces of the modern world. Now here, the traditions come to conform increasingly to the cognitive and normative assumptions of the contemporary secular world, be it materialism, scientism, or even hedonism. The most obvious illustrations of this are found in those religious communities where the traditions are so liberalized, and so desacrilized that the languages of traditional faith are translated into the languages of contemporary therapy, or contemporary politics, or science. A third option is that the religious community can resist modernity, and the pressures that would dilute the purity of traditional religious expression. Fundamentalism, I would argue, derives its identity principally from a posture of resistance to the modern world order. Of course, the sociological reality is that for traditions that engage with modernity there is generally a give and take process. A dialectical process, if you will, at play that involves both accommodating to the modern world, even if its unwitting, as well as forms of resistance. Some accommodate more than others, while others resist more than others. Nevertheless, fundamentalist religion is defined principally, principally, a defensive reaction against the world disaffirming qualities inherent to the modern world order. At root, there is no fundamentalism without modernity.

The argument that fundamentalism emerges out of the defensive interplay between orthodoxy and modernity can be crystallized by three simple propositions. Nearly everything else that distinguishes fundamentalism in its global contours derives from these, namely, what all fundamentalism seem to share in common is the deep and worrisome sense that history has gone awry. What went wrong with history is modernity in its various guises. The calling of the fundamentalists, therefore, is to make history right again. That's the heart of my presentation.

Let me give a couple of examples. First of all, Protestant fundamentalism. From the early colonial period in New England to the late 19th century there was tremendous optimism that God was doing a wondrous work in this world through the heirs of the reformation, particularly those who settled on American shores. America would be a Christian commonwealth, a righteous empire, a redeemer nation, to use some of the phrases. The blessings of revitalistic awakenings, as well as the hardship of famine and war first with the French and later with the British for independence, and even the Civil War in the late 19th century were all interpreted as a part of a providential design. God's favor for America would continue so long as its people remain true to its faith. And yet, the pernicious effects of modernism in the forms of higher criticism, evolution, the social gospel, echumenonism and the like, threatened not only the integrity of true faith as they saw it, and this was held even within main stream religion, but also the very hope of the cause of Christianity in America. By the end of the 19th century, among some, history was going awry and it was up to the most faithful followers of the gospel to make it right again. It is only in the light of this purpose that one can really understand the emergence of dozens of Bible colleges and institutes, the founding of numerous fundamentalist periodicals, the establishment of an organization called The World Christian's Fundamentalist Association in 1919, as well as the wars within all of the major denominations, but especially the Baptist and the Presbyterian. Not least of course, the battle over evolution. It's only in this light that one can also properly understand nearly a century later, the efforts of Protestant fundamentalist to reverse the legal status of abortion, to illegitimate progressive sexual and familial attitudes, and to return with the practice of prayer in public schools, to elect Christian politicians and so on.
As the Reverend Jerry Falwell put it in an "I love America" rally in 1980, quote, "we begin to see our country, our republic crumbling. We see a moving away from God and away from the principals responsible for her greatness. We feel, therefore, that it high time for the people of God to awaken from their sleep. We, thus, feel a primary obligation in these last days before Jesus comes to call this nation back to God."

The consequences? Well, consider the case of homosexuality and again Falwell. "There are states in these United States that now have legalized homosexual marriages. I really cannot imagine that Sodom and Gomorrah had gotten that low, and somehow we have. And yet if God allows America to continue, He owes an apology to Sodom and Gomorrah." One could go on and on at great length, and at the heard of this is the struggle to define, and re-define, and understand history from a certain perspective. And in this effort, once again, if American protestant fundamentalist were to set history right again they would need to shape the values of the larger society.

Let me move on to Islamic fundamentalism. The story of Islamic fundamentalism bears a strong resemblance to that of Protestant fundamentalism, at least in its general contours. It's different of course in the details. Like earl protestant America, early Islamic history was also marked by tremendous success. The first community of nomadic believers expanded numerically, grew in geo-political dominance, and prospered in their cultural and religious accomplishments. To the faithful, these early successes confirmed that Allah was working out his divine plan within history itself. Even after the devastating Mongol invasion in the 13th century, and the collapse of the growing Muslim dynasty, a revitalization and expansion of Arab civilization in its medieval period allowed Muslims to reinterpret the crisis as occurring within the divine pattern of historical development. however, such a reinterpretation has not been possible for Muslims in the face of Islam's most recent crisis: its confrontation with the modern world order.

This confrontation came as early as the 17th-18th century with the expansion of Western capitalist economies into the Middle East, Mongol, India and the Ottoman Empire. By the end of the 18th century, various Western powers had established direct economic, political and military control over much of that region. European hegemony meant, among other things, the introduction of radical, political and administrative reform. And, the subjugation of Islamic culture and ideals to Western traditions of rationalism, secularism, and pluralism. The once imperial civilization of Islam had lost control of its collective destiny. History, in their perspective, had gone awry. And ever since there has been a pervasive confusion as to how to salvage that history, even fundamental doubt as to whether that history can be salvaged at all.
Even after colonial rule came to an end, many post-colonial governments were administered by westernized Muslim elite, who continue to embrace modern European modes of thought and rule, promising increased economic and social prosperity. For the religiously orthodox, however, this accommodation of modern/western values through nationalist, pan-Arab and socialist experiments, as well as the secularizing of law, the courts and public education. Not to mention the appropriation of Western goods and advertising, Western dress, and so on, only brought about moral and political decay. Said Keta, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, described the crisis of the present moment this way, and I quote him, "man is at the crossroads, and that is the choice, Islam or Jahilia. Modern style Jahilia in the industrialized societies of Europe and America is essentially similar to the old time Jahilia in pagan and nomadic Arabia." Now, invoking Jahilia, Keta is using well known imagery to contextualize the present, to interpret the present. He's harkening back to the familiar story of the pre-Islamic period of Arabic tribalism and ignorance with respect to Allah. Animating modern Jahilia accordingly is the secularizing ideology of nationalism which places patriotism to the state over common religious confession, thus destroying the continuity of the Uma or Corporate solidarity of all Muslims. Which reduces Shiori, the fundamentals of Islamic conduct to a Westernized permissive ethic. Keta concludes, and I quotes, "this is the most dangerous Jihalia that has ever menaced our faith."

Writing from a Shiite perspective, one Islamic cleric characterized the unique destructive force of modernity as an unstoppable, monstrous machine. And he writes, "we have been unable to preserve our own historical character in the face of he machine and its fateful onslaught." At a societal level, modernity, what he calls West Toxification, is more destructive than dynamite. This cleric quips, "what border or domain can stand up to the influence of Pepsi Cola?"
The Islamic Fundamentalist solution to the insidiousness of modernity, however it's conflated within the west, is to return to strict adherence to Islam in every sphere of life. A series of influential books by the Islamic Fundamentalist activist Kadawi stated the fundamentalist solution clearly. The Islamic solution means that Islam is both the orienting maxim and the guide for the community in all areas of life, material as well as intellectual. The Islamic solution means that the entirety of life is molded into a fundamentally Islamic form and character.

Like the earliest proto-fundamentalist reactions against the interior deterioration of Islam in the early 18th and 19th century, 20th and 21st century movement all share the common passion to recover the classical experience of Islam, a history without deviation, and the original meaning of Islamic message, a faith without distortion. The fundamentalist solution demands nothing less than the establishment of a totally Islamic social and political order.

To do that requires both internal reform and external reaction. With regard to internal reform, it means, and I quote Kadawi, "cleansing all foreign bodies and secret germs that have perverted it." One Islamic cleric, sounding very much like his Protestant counterparts decrying secular humanist, characterizes the compromisers within Islam this way: "the occidentic is a man totally without belief or conviction. To such an extent that he not only believes in nothing, but he also does not actively disbelieve in anything. He cares neither whether society is transformed or not, nor whether religion or irreligion prevails. He is not even irreligious, he is indifferent. He even goes to the Mosque at times, just as he goes to the club or to the movies, but everywhere he is only a spectator." So in an attempt to recover identity and Islam, fundamentalist first have to rid themselves of those who have been compromised who are among them, but beyond internal reform is the mandate to resist the external influences of pagan societies. Amongst Sunni and Shiite Muslims, many interpreted the defeat of the Westernized secular governments of Arab nations in the six-day war as a punishment from God for abandoning the true path to embrace the promises of man-made progress. Society came to be seen as completely godless and irredeemable, and as a result, militant Islamic fundamentalist groups such as Al-Jihad concluded that their primary task was to forcibly overthrow the government of Jahilia. Hence, after their successful assassination of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Al jihad leader Mohammad Ibn Alsalan Faray could hope that once Pharoe was killed the faithful Egyptians would rise in holy war against the unbelieving state. Clearly from such incendiary speech it is clear that for the fundamentalist the stakes are of the gravest consequence. Once again, nothing less is at stake than the divine plan for Islamic history, and indeed, world history.

In Judaism Fundamentalism takes form primarily within religious Zionism, and its clearest expression is Gush Abonin, or the block, the faithful. Although movement such as Satmar Hasidism, the Nitrite Carta, and Agudath Israel bear strong resemblance in certain respects, Gushamni is emblematic. But, in this case, a slight adjustment has to be made to the argument. For Jewish fundamentalist it's not that history has gone wrong, it's that history could go wrong. As in Protestant and Islamic fundamentalist, so for the Gushamunin, history has a sacred quality. History is God's means at communicating with his people. To the Gushamuni the sacred quality of history is revealed through the dual themes of the end of the Jewish Diaspora and the reclamation of the land of Israel made possible by the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948. Around these two themes, a religious Zionist narrative has emerged, focusing on the Messianic redemption and culmination of history. The Gushamuni's manifesto states, and I quote, "our aim is to bring about a large movement of reawakening among the Jewish people for the fulfillment of the Zionist vision in its full scope. The sources of the vision are the Jewish tradition and roots, and its ultimate objective is the full redemption of the Jewish people and the entire world."

The theology of Gushamnuni is rooted in the whole land of Israel. Within this religious Zionist narrative, the establishment of Israel in 1948 and its military victories in the six day war of 67' were signs of providential process. Celebrating the official creation of modern Israel and the consequence end of exile, one Rabbi proclaimed, and I quote: "the state of Israel was created and established by the council of nations by order of the sovereign lord of the universe so that the clear commandment in the Torah, that they should inherit and settle the land, would be fulfilled." To this Rabbi and to the core leadership of the Gushanmunin these events signified nothing less than the realization of the Messianic process. Hence, the intransigentship of the Gushanmunin in resettling the land, particularly the most politically controversial territory such as the West Bank and the Gaza strip. It's properly understood, not so much as a political statement, but as an eschatological proclamation. To their view, present day Israelis have a Mitzvah, a secret duty to repossess and settle the land, for the land itself contains an imminent holiness. Withdrawal, therefore, would contravene God's will and represent a step backward in the Messianic process of redemption. In this way it is the sacred duty that by means of our rule, one can accomplish the act of redemption. For this reason, the men and women of Gushumnin have made their lifework to ensure that the occupied territories are incorporated permanently into the state of Israel, such hastening the fulfillment of Jewish destiny.

The thread of modernity in this narrative is in fact subtle, but no less real, and it goes to the very heart of the religious, ethnic and national identity of the Israelis. World Jewry has been divided into those maintaining strong commitments to religious tradition and community at one end. And at the very other end, non-observance secularism maintaining commitments only to the cultural and ethnic heritage. For many Jewish fundamentalism, this division caused by modern secularism is simply the latest version of Hellenism. The ways and attitudes of the gentile world. Most egregiously secularism is held responsible for delaying the redemptive trajectory of history. Indeed, as the yon-Kippur wore and the Camp David Accords seemed to make plain, the secularism of the significant section of Israeli society backed by the secular state are cause for more immediate concern than the constant aggression of the Arabs and the Palestinians. The near failure of the Yon-Kippur war and the territorial concessions made in the name of an ill-founded peace were jeopardizing the Jewish messianic destiny. Again, if the faithful did not act quickly, history could go wrong. Yet distinct from other forms of fundamentalism, Gushimnin understands modern secularism to be a step, even if it’s a transitory step, in the redemptive process of history rather than a complete deviation from the divine will in history.

Needless to say, there are many other characteristics about fundamentalism that are very important to discuss. Many of them are implied in what I've already said. For one, there's the close relationship between religious ideology and national identity. Within fundamentalist movements, the integrity of the faith and the future of the nation are mutually entwined. The defense of one, implies the defense of the other. Another characteristic is the proclivity among all fundamentalism to base both religious authority and the rejection of modernity upon the literal reading of scriptural text. The significance of scripturalism is that it establishes very clear, symbolic boundaries between good and evil, right and wrong. It also establishes the criteria for distinguishing the faithful from the unfaithful and the infidel. Given the moral and religious ambiguities that seem intrinsic to modern and post modern thought, and aesthetics, the text, and an inerrant reading of the text becomes the source of religious and moral authority, establishing safe, definable and absolute standards of life and thought.

Not least, fundamentalism is not just a theological reaction to modernity. Orthodoxy is invariably linked to orthopraxy. This is to say, that all fundamentalism are characterized to a varying degrees, by a quality of organized anger. The issue here is one of means, the mechanisms by which truth is defended and the forces of modernity are kept at bay. Making history right again requires the methodical mobilization of a wide range of resources. Certainly, these are the resources of cultural reproduction: school, newspapers, magazines, radio, television, direct mail. In other words, the technologies of modernity are not resisted, the ideology of modernity is. Each participant has his or her own story to tell, that links with the larger meta-narrative of Islamic, or Protestant, or Jewish, or Hindu, of Buddhist faith. For individuals, these stories provide identity and meaning in life. For the movement they provide a profound source of solidarity for all involved. And at the intersection of personal life and movement, we see stories provide a framework of duty, motivation and obligation.

Maintained by Gloria Smith
Last Modified: Monday, 09-Feb-2004 15:58:45 EST
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