Dennis Ross
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
"Waging War on Terror and Pursuing Middle East Peace"
April 23, 2002

Dennis Ross: I am going to use a diplomatic term to describe where we are right now. And the only term or phrase I can use is what a mess. Now, with that as kind of a preview…let me do the following. I want to offer you a perspective on President Bush’s speech, what I thought was good about it, what concerned me about it, something about Secretary Powell’s trip, and then I am going to give you what I think are the real options that are available right now. And I wish I could be more upbeat but I think I have to be realistic. And as a result, I am going to give you what I think are the real options that are available at this point.

When Bush made his speech, I actually was quite encouraged. I was encouraged for a couple of reasons. The first reason I was encouraged is because I thought that a basic premise of the administration’s approach to the Middle East was changing. The basic premise seemed to be that you really couldn’t do anything until both sides were exhausted. Now, the problem with an approach that is based on exhaustion is that exhaustion doesn’t occur in a steady state. Exhaustion results from a process. You go through stages to get to exhaustion. And one of the dangers that I saw with exhaustion or a premise of exhaustion is that you would begin to cross thresholds that might discredit peacemaking itself. And if you want an indication of how far things have gone, you don’t even have to look at what has happened between the Israelis and the Palestinians. When the ambassador of the United States in a place like Bahrain can trigger a demonstration against his embassy because at a model-UN forum, someone suggested there be a moment of silence for the Palestinian victims of what is going on. And he suggests that there be also a moment of silence for the Israeli victims. And that triggers a demonstration. You know that anger and rage are characterizing what is going on in the Arab world. Bahrain is not exactly been the hot bed of activism on the Palestinian question. And yet that is what you were seeing.

You want an indication on the Israeli side of the ledger, there was a poll, I think three weeks ago now in which 46% of the Israeli public supported the idea of transfer…transfer Palestinians. This is an idea that was always understood in Israel as being a lunatic idea. But when people are angry and they are afraid and they are insecure, they are going to begin to embrace ideas that in fact are beyond the pale.

And that is one of the consequences of exhaustion. Because as you get…as you try to reach that point, you may come perilously close to being no longer to make peace at all. And I am afraid that we are in fact very close to that stage.

So, when the President gave his speech I was encouraged because it suggested there was a different approach in mind. Now, there was a second reason I was encouraged. I was encouraged because the President engaged in what I call truth telling. The Middle East is a region of the world where misologists tend to govern. And peace is pretty hard to make as long as misologists predominate. What I saw in the President’s speech was some pretty straight talk to all parties.

To the Palestinians he said your leader has not fulfilled his promises. He is responsible for the predicament he finds himself in. Is largely responsible. And the fact of the matter is suicide bombing is not going to serve your cause.

To the Israeli’s he said, you have a right to defend yourself but there is no military solution to your problem with the Palestinians. At the end of the day there is going to have to be a Palestinian state that is politically and economically viable. So, you have got to think about the political process.

To the Arabs, he said, your declaration of peaceful intent is very important, but it would be far more compelling if your state run media’s would not glorify suicide bombers as martyrs as opposed to the murderers that they are. He also said it was important for Arab leaders to assume a responsibility and he even used language where he talked about them assuming responsibility by filling in in effect either with or for the Palestinians as the Israeli’s withdraw.

Now that was the point where I began to have some concerns. Not that he was calling for the Arabs to assume responsibility. They need to assume responsibility. We can’t be the only one who assumes responsibility. But, if one knows the history of the area, the one thing you know for sure is that the Arabs are not going to assume the responsibility for the Palestinians. There isn’t a single Arab regime that is prepared to stand up and say or have Yassar Arafat stand up and say, for example the President Mubarrak asked us to surrender our rights. There isn’t a single Arab regime that feels so secure, so legitimate that it is in a position to do that.

It is not wrong to get Arab leaders to assume a responsibility. But, it is an illusion to believe that somehow they are going to take the place of the Palestinians. In a sense, I think that assumption about the role the Arab leaders could play inform the structure and sequence Secretary Powell’s trip.

You recall he didn’t go to the area immediately. You had the President’s speech. And it was Sunday before he left, and it was the following Thursday before he arrived in Israel. It is pretty clear to me that there was a presumption that having called for the Arabs to assume greater responsibility, the Secretary as a result of the speech would now start in Morocco where he would see the Crown Prince Abdula as well as the King of Morocco. Then see the President of Egypt. Also see the King of Jordan before he would go into Israel.

I think the assumption was that doing that and then seeing the Europeans would create a consensus that would create greater leverage on both the Israelis and the Palestinians. But, what it produced instead was pressure, which I am afraid, was predictable pressure on the Secretary of State to produce with the Israelis. You will recall that the administration was rather coy about whether or not the Secretary would see Chairman Arafat. I did an interview the day he was leaving and I was asked that question, will he see Chairman Arafat. I said, of course he will see Chairman Arafat. Even if he wasn’t inclined, the first meeting he is going to have with the King of Morocco and then the Saudi Crown Prince and so forth will be characterized by an insistence that they can’t do anything until he sees Chairman Arafat. I said, probably beyond that they will say they can’t do anything until the Israelis withdraw their forces and end this operation. And they can’t do anything until we change the political approach so it is not a question of sequence: security first, politics later.

In effect, that is what happened. And it was predictable. Unfortunately when he then went to Israel basically what he got Sharon was exactly the opposite. What I was hoping is that on this trip the Secretary would stay until the Israelis ended their operation because there was going to be very little that was going to be possible if he left before that time. And effectively, as you all know, he did leave before that time. And now we are at a point where it is very hard to see what is going to change the landscape.

There are ideas that the administration is banding about. One idea is that the Director of the CIA should go out there now. My advice would be, don’t do it. The only thing he can do is go talk about the security. And what he is going to find is in the case of the Palestinians, they are going to impose a whole series of conditions that start with the fact that talk to us about a political process and it’s content before we have to deal with questions of security. And he will get exactly the opposite from Prime Minister Sharon.

You also hear talk about an international conference. Bill made reference to the fact that I had a lot to do with our getting to Madrid. I know something about what it takes to put together an international conference. Madrid was put together in 1991 after a very successful American conducted war in a situation where our credibility was probably at its zenith in the area. And even then it took us eight months and eight shuttles…eight separate trips and eight separate shuttles in the region to get to Madrid.

The circumstances today are very different. We don’t have that credibility. We don’t have that leverage. The mood is very different. And you can predict pretty much right now what the conditions would be that each side is basically going to try to impose. On the Arab side is going to be at least the condition that Arafat has to be there. And there will probably also be the condition that the Saudi idea adopted by the Arab League which is normalization with Israel in return for full withdrawal to the June 4, ’67 lines has to be at basis to the conference. And on the flip side you are going to see Sharon say I am not going to deal with Arafat and we can’t accept full withdrawal as the basis for the conference.

The conference could be useful but the conference has to have a connection to the realities on the ground. One of the problems with any grand ideas right now is that if there isn’t some kind of connection to what is happening on the ground, you are going to find that it undercuts what is going on.

So, with that as kind of a preview, what do I think the real options are right now? Well, I think there are three. The first is what I would call what Sharon would like, which is a bypass Arafat option. He doesn’t want to deal with Arafat. He may want to exile Arafat. Let’s look at for a moment at what this means. If you exile Arafat, and I am not sure you can do it, but if you were to exile Arafat, one thing you can count on is that he will travel around. He will be the victim. He will be able to say quite legitimately that he has no responsibility for what is going on on the ground in the territories. He will make it very clear that in a sense he is the only one who can represent the Palestinians and others…anyone who would think about trying to step forward in his place would be labeled at best a traitor. I don’t think too many people are going to step forward in such a circumstance.

Now, does that mean there is no basis on which to bypass Arafat? No, not necessarily but I don’t think you think about bypassing Arafat in terms of having an individual who is an alternative. That is not going to evolve any time soon or emerge anytime soon. What you can think of is if you want to pursue a bypass Arafat option, then you have to basically be able to demonstrate that he was the obstacle to peace. You have to show that a solution is out there, that is credible, convincing and compelling. And the only reason that you can’t achieve it is because he blocks it. Bypassing Arafat is a revolutionary option. You have to have a political strategy that is just as revolutionary if you want to try to bypass him.

What that means is that you can’t say well there can be a Palestinian state on fifty percent of the West Bank. Because there is no Palestinian around, even those who are absolutely the most committed to living in peace with Israel who could accept such an outcome or an option. You will have to have a serious initiative that in my judgment looks a lot like what the Clinton ideas were. They would have to be presented by us. The Israelis would presumably have to support it. We would have to present it, work in advance of presenting it to get others to accept it or at least to support it so that if we announced it we would have the Europeans and maybe even some Arab states, but at least the Europeans who would endorse what we were doing. That wouldn’t change things immediately but at least it would show there is a solution out there. And if there is a solution out there, that may change the realities over time.

So, if you want to go the bypass Arafat route, you have to deal with the inevitable logic of what is required. It can’t be business as usual on the political front. It has to be a pretty dramatic initiative that demonstrates there is a solution out there that most of the international community would see as being credible.

Now, I can see some problems with this option. Not the least of which is I wouldn’t predict today that the Prime Minister would be likely to accept it. So, let’s say what about option two. Well there is an option two that is more conventional than option one. In various forms it has been tried already but I am going to give it a slightly different cast. It is what I call a timeline option. It is a timeline where there is a sequence of steps, sequence of obligations. A sequence that is built on security confidence building measures and a date certain for permanent status negotiations with an agenda that we would put on the table so the agenda wouldn’t have to be negotiated. The agenda would involve at least to begin with, statehood, disengagement. Which means disengagement from points of friction. Which means a kind of gradual withdrawal and security arrangements.

The Palestinians will want to see the withdrawal. The Israelis need to see the security arrangements. To give this a certain greater concreteness from the Palestinian standpoint, you could also put on this timeline a date certain when statehood would actually be recognized. This would be a variant of what Shimon Perez has been doing where they have basically agreed to the idea…although it is not clear who else has agreed to the idea…that there would be recognition of the Palestinian state within the areas where it has responsibility…at least punitive responsibility…according to the various agreements. Which means about 40% of the West Bank and a little over 60% of Gaza. You would have the Palestinian state recognized not only by us by the Israelis. It would go to the UN. It will then negotiate with the Israelis as an equal.

Its political status would be transformed. Psychologically you would see a change. And in such a circumstance, the Palestinians would be gaining something politically. The Israelis would be getting something from a security standpoint because again there would be a timeline that is very specific in terms of obligations. Now, to make this work there is going to have to be monitoring so that the obligations are in fact fulfilled. There will have to be a consequence for the non-fulfillment of obligations. There will have to be a kind of constant of holding of both sides to commitments that they have made which by the way, if you asked me one of our failings in the last decade is that we didn’t hold both sides to the commitments and obligations that they made. There wasn’t the kind of accountability that would be necessary.

There could be a reason that both might find this useful. In the case of the Israelis and in the case of Prime Minister Sharon, he has carried out military operations that will in fact bring a respite. When you do what the Israeli military has done, you kill enough of the people who organize the cells of terror, you arrest enough of them, you are going to find that you disrupt the capacity to carry out terror. Not only because the cells themselves are small, disciplined, but nonetheless are based upon some guidance. If you are putting…if you are basically disrupting those cells, if you are putting people that are in them either in jail or they are in hiding it is a lot more difficult for them to carry out attacks, if you have broken up and destroyed a lot of the bomb making labs, you are going to find that it is harder to carry out acts of terror against Israelis.

The only problem is the terrorist infrastructure that exists in the West Bank is not based on tremendous expense. It is not based on high sophistication. And the people who have been killed or arrested can be replaced. It will take some time but eventually and maybe not so long in the future, what you are going to see is that in fact, that infrastructure is reconstituted.

Now if you are Prime Minister Sharon you have an interest in building on the respite so that the respite is not short-lived and so that it begins to endure more. If this timeline approach offers you a way to build on that then that may be a preferable way to go. If you are Arafat, you may also seek a respite at this point. It may be that your own people need a respite given what has happened with the Israeli operations. So, maybe you too want at least to begin to do something. And with the recognition of statehood, with a credible political process that has a specific timeline, you have something to point to along with the reality that you can also explain that you were under some pressure to do this.

So, is this an option likely to work? Well, maybe. But, now let me point out the problems with the option. From Sharon’s standpoint, it is still Arafat-centric. And he doesn’t want to deal with Arafat. And from Arafat’s standpoint, first he may believe he can get more by holding out. Arafat sees that after all there has been a swing of the pendulum in terms of international public opinion. He tends to do better both with his own public when he is a victim and he certainly is doing better internationally when he is a victim. He may feel that the best thing to do is let the things get worse because there could be an international intervention from the outside and maybe they will impose a solution that relieves him of the need to make a decision at all. And last but not least, from Arafat’s standpoint, if you really do what is required according to this timeline he is going to have to do some very hard things towards some of those on the Palestinian side that he is never been too keen to do in the first place. And there still is a sequence and he may just decide to opt out. He may prefer this is just not the way to go because what is required of him is too costly and what he gains in return is not worth enough.

So, where does that leave us because the arguments I just made might end up being fairly potent in terms of saying option two isn’t likely to work. I am afraid where that leaves us is a third option. And it is a third option that isn’t based on a solution. It is based on what I would describe as a way station. And the way station may be what is known as unilateral separation on the Israeli side. The Israeli government today doesn’t support it. I don’t think the Palestinians will embrace it either. However, there is a very strong presumption at least within the Israeli population this is something that they favor. And there is a group made up of over a thousand ex-general officers of the IDF who favor it. Not because they see it as somehow a benefit or an advantage to the Palestinians but because they think it is necessary for Israel.

What they are calling for is a withdrawal from the Gaza Settlements and the maintenance of a narrow strip along the border between Egypt and Israel and withdrawal from isolated settlements in the West Bank so that what they see as the illogic of having large numbers of soldiers having to protect small numbers of settlers, is ended. Because in such a circumstance, the bulk of the Israeli population is difficult to protect from acts of terror so they want to withdrawal from the isolated settlements and the roads that have to be protected to get to the isolated settlements in the West Bank. They want to build a fence, they want to create buffer zones, they want to create some no man’s lands. They basically want to get out of the Palestinian lives. Not so the Palestinians can come into Israel but so the Israelis are basically not involved with them. And the Palestinians can breath again.

So from their standpoint you can create security for the Israelis, the Palestinians can breath again and the net effect of this is not that you are going to get a solution, but it gives you a capacity to make life better for both. Eventually life can change to the point where negotiations become possible again.

Now, what are the downsides with this particular option? Well, one is that for those who embrace this Hezbollah model which is that violence works, this looks like the success of the model. Because maybe you have had twenty months of pain, but after all after twenty months of pain, you have succeeded in getting the Israelis to withdrawal part way. So, another twenty months of pain, maybe they will continue to withdrawal. And maybe you never have to stop. You just keep it up until you basically don’t see an Israeli state any longer. That is a potential liability to say the least.

I am not sure there is a consensus in Israel by the way on what the line would actually be. But, I do think that this is an option that I have to tell you, I have never favored because it is not the triumph of diplomacy. It is the failure of diplomacy. But, I am afraid it is where we are headed. Because I don’t see other options out there right now that have much prospect of working. I see others that are illusory. I see this one as being one where the natural evolution is likely to take place.

Now, if it is true, one of the things that we should be doing is positioning ourselves for how to make this a more enduring option and one that will make it possible for negotiations to emerge at some point. It should lead us not only to talk to the Israelis if they end up going this way about developing a line that makes the most amount of sense from both Israeli and Palestinian standpoint. It should lead us to try to broker some understandings with the Palestinians about what comes after. It might lead us as well to think about an international presence filling in as the Israelis actually do withdrawal.

As I said, it is not an option I ever thought I would be supportive of and I am not sure I am even now, but I am afraid it is where we are headed. I started out by saying I would like to be more upbeat. Unfortunately it is very difficult to be upbeat at this point. And I think the one thing that is required regardless of which of the options that are going to adopted or which of the options is likely to emerge, one thing that is required is that the US administration is going to have to invest heavily in whichever of these options are pursued. If one thing has been demonstrated over the last twenty months more than anything else is that left to their own devices, the situation will only get worse. So, the question is whichever option you take, whatever the difficulties associated with it, whatever the risks associated with it, having us stand on the sidelines isn’t going to make any of these choices any easier. And even if in the end option three is what begins to evolve, even that will require a level of American engagement so that that doesn’t end up making a situation worse.